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Abstract
This Article analyzes the allocation of the power to decide on hostile takeovers as between
directors and shareholders. In it I show who actually has power in a takeover and what factors are
at work to grant that authority. Although directors are traditionally considered to be in charge of
deciding the outcome of a hostile takeover of a Delaware corporation, shareholders nevertheless
may have the power to reverse the outcome through a vote. Even though shareholders sometimes
lack the power to determine the outcome of a takeover bid, the reason for that is not embedded in
the takeover regime itself. Instead, rules, principles, and practices of corporate law that are exter-
nal to the takeover regime act as barriers to shareholder power. These barriers, which I designate
“corporate law collateral factors,” include staggered boards, limitations to director removability,
the inability of shareholders either to call special meetings or to act by written consent, superma-
jority rules, proxy regimes, and conflict of interest regimes. This Article reports original empirical
evidence on the number and market capitalization of Delaware companies that are affected by
each corporate law collateral factor and argues that scholars and courts have overemphasized the
importance of the takeover regime itself and underemphasized the corporate law collateral factors.
Policymakers and interpreters should thus address all corporate law collateral factors within the
body of takeover law, whether or not statutory. Given the importance of takeovers, it is strange not
to consider them in the context of tailored rules that acknowledge the existence and impact of such
factors. Leaving the corporate law collateral factors in a vacuum to general corporate law does a
disservice to takeover players and stakeholders.
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ABSTRACT 
This Article analyzes the allocation of the power to decide on hostile 
takeovers as between directors and shareholders. In it I show who 
actually has power in a takeover and what factors are at work to 
grant that authority. Although directors are traditionally considered 
to be in charge of deciding the outcome of a hostile takeover of a 
Delaware corporation, shareholders nevertheless may have the 
power to reverse the outcome through a vote. Even though 
shareholders sometimes lack the power to determine the outcome of 
a takeover bid, the reason for that is not embedded in the takeover 
regime itself. Instead, rules, principles, and practices of corporate 
law that are external to the takeover regime act as barriers to 
shareholder power. These barriers, which I designate “corporate law 
collateral factors,” include staggered boards, limitations to director 
removability, the inability of shareholders either to call special 
meetings or to act by written consent, supermajority rules, proxy 
regimes, and conflict of interest regimes. This Article reports 
original empirical evidence on the number and market capitalization 
of Delaware companies that are affected by each corporate law 
collateral factor and argues that scholars and courts have 
overemphasized the importance of the takeover regime itself and 
underemphasized the corporate law collateral factors. Policymakers 
and interpreters should thus address all corporate law collateral 
factors within the body of takeover law, whether or not statutory. 
Given the importance of takeovers, it is strange not to consider them 
in the context of tailored rules that acknowledge the existence and 
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impact of such factors. Leaving the corporate law collateral factors 
in a vacuum to general corporate law does a disservice to takeover 
players and stakeholders. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article analyzes the allocation of power between directors and 
shareholders in hostile takeovers. It explores who actually has power in 
a hostile takeover and what factors are at work to bestow such power. 
Although directors are traditionally considered to be in charge in 
deciding the outcome of a hostile takeover of a Delaware corporation, 
shareholders nevertheless may have the power to reverse the outcome 
via a vote.1 This Article argues that even though shareholders often lack 
the power to determine the outcome of a takeover bid, the reason for that 
is not embedded in the takeover regime itself. Instead, combinations of 
rules, principles, and practices of corporate law that are external to the 
takeover regime act as barriers to shareholder power. 
Let us start with takeover laws. The regulation of anti-takeover 
defenses is arguably one of the most debated topics in corporate law. 
Common wisdom suggests that there are few other fields in corporate 
governance with so little convergence in the most developed financial 
markets. During the 1980s, state legislatures and courts in the United 
States responded to an unprecedented surge in hostile takeovers by 
providing companies the freedom to adopt defenses in response to 
unsolicited bids.2 Delaware in particular made it clear that, so long as 
shareholders can replace a board through a proxy fight when faced with 
an unsolicited tender offer, directors have the power to keep the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985). 
 2. See Mark J. Roe, Takeover Politics, in THE DEAL DECADE: WHAT TAKEOVERS 
AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS MEAN FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 321, 340-47 
(Margaret M. Blair ed., 1993) [hereinafter Roe, Takeover Politics] (lobbying efforts by 
corporations resulted in the enactment of various anti-takeover laws throughout the 
United States, with Delaware adopting a mild approach to avoid the risk of federal 
intervention). 
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company independent and therefore erect (or maintain existing) anti-
takeover devices, most notably, the poison pill.3 
The law evolved quite differently in Europe, where two opposite 
regimes emerged. Since the late 1950s, target companies in the United 
Kingdom have been subject to some variation of the “board neutrality 
rule,” which prohibits the board of a target company from engaging in 
defensive actions without shareholder approval.4 In contrast, long-
standing aversion to takeover-capitalism in countries like Germany and 
the Netherlands allowed companies to use defenses. These differing 
approaches led to a compromise on the European Union’s 2004 
Directive on Takeover Bids (the “Directive”), which made optional the 
regulation of takeover defenses. The Directive adhered to the board 
neutrality rule,5 but it allowed each Member State to decide whether to 
implement it; however, if a Member State rejected the rule, companies 
incorporated in that State could still implement it on a voluntary basis.6 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1345, 1351, 1353 (Del. 1985) 
(adopting a rights plan by the board of directors of a target as a prospective takeover 
defense is protected by the business judgment rule). 
 4. See John Armour, Jack B. Jacobs & Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Evolution of 
Hostile Takeover Regimes in Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytical 
Framework, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 219, 235-36 (2011) (noting that the principle was first 
encapsulated in the Notes on Amalgamation of British Businesses in the autumn of 
1959, which was self-regulation adopted by “a committee consisting of trade groups 
representing merchant banks, institutional investors, the largest commercial banks, and 
the London Stock Exchange,” which had been secretly invited by the Governor of the 
Bank of England to craft takeover rules in the aftermath of the takeover of British 
Aluminium of 1958) for a discussion of the origins of the board neutrality rule. 
 5. Under the board neutrality rule, the directors of a target company are 
compelled to obtain prior shareholders’ authorization when engaging in defensive 
actions, “which may result in the frustration of the bid.” Directive 2004/25/EC, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Takeover Bids, 2004 O.J. 
(L 142) 19. 
 6. Council Directive 2004/25, art. 12, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 21 (EC); see also 
Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Document: 
Report on the Implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids, at 3-5, SEC (2007) 
268 (Feb. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Report on the Implementation of the Directive on 
Takeover Bids]. The European Legislature also introduced a reciprocity mechanism 
under which Member States can decide whether to relax the prohibitions and 
restrictions arising out of the board neutrality rule in the event a bid is made by a 
company not subject to such rules. Council Directive 2004/25, art. 12, 2004 O.J. (L 
142) 21 (EC). Therefore, the Directive is optional in what is arguably one of its most 
significant rules. Matteo Gatti, Optionality Arrangements and Reciprocity in the 
European Takeover Directive, 6 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 553, 558-59 (2005) (showing 
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Subsequently, while the United Kingdom and (at least initially) France 
enacted the board neutrality rule, Germany did not. 
This Article analyzes the different allocation of corporate powers 
between directors and shareholders when responding to an unsolicited 
acquisition in the Delaware system, a pro-target regime, as opposed to 
jurisdictions like the U.K. system or other pro-shareholder regimes that 
have adopted the board neutrality rule. In particular, the purpose of this 
Article is to provide a structural assessment of the ultimate differences 
between the two approaches. 
Traditionally considered antithetical by legal commentators,7 the 
Delaware and U.K. systems are in fact similar in that in both, a 
shareholder vote can play a pivotal role in the outcome of an unsolicited 
acquisition attempt.8 For example, Delaware allows companies to adopt 
and maintain defenses subject to the possibility for the bidder to oust the 
board through a shareholder vote.9 In contrast, the U.K. system prohibits 
                                                                                                                 
that national legislatures can choose among sixteen different regimes, with the 
possibility for companies to opt-in to the board neutrality rule even if their Member 
State did not adopt it). For a while, the regimes adopted in the three biggest markets—
the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—were different from one another. Report 
on the Implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids, at 12 (showing that (i) the 
United Kingdom adopted the board neutrality rule and not the reciprocity option, (ii) 
France had adopted both the board neutrality rule and the reciprocity option, and (iii) 
Germany did not adopt the board neutrality rule, but it did adopt the reciprocity option). 
In 2014, France reformed its takeover law and converted the board neutrality rule into 
an opt-in provision: see Article 10(V) of Loi 2014-384 of March 29, 2014 “visant à 
reconquérir l’économie réelle” (literally “aiming to reconquer the real economy”). 
 7. See, e.g., John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes Takeover Regulation 
and Why: The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1727, 1729 (2007) (stating that “unless shareholders consent, the [U.K.] Code strictly 
prohibits management from employing any defensive tactics that would have the effect 
of frustrating an actual or anticipated bid. In contrast, management in the United States 
has a good deal more flexibility to engage in defensive tactics, provided that these can 
be justified in accordance with their fiduciary duties”); see also Edward F. Greene, 
Regulatory and Legislative Responses to Takeover Activity in the 1980s: The United 
States and Europe, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1539, 1574 (1991) (noting that “the ability of 
directors in the U.K. and Europe to use takeover defenses is much more limited than 
that of their American counterparts” and that “[a]t one extreme is the U.K., where 
directors are very much accountable to shareholders”). 
 8. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Oliver Hart, Takeover Bids Vs. Proxy Fights in Contests 
for Corporate Control 4 (Harvard Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. Law, Econ. & Bus., 
Discussion Paper No. 336, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=290584. 
 9. This Article does not focus on the fiduciary duties of directors under Revlon, 
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). The Revlon 
ruling established an enhanced standard of conduct that compels directors to maximize 
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defenses unless shareholders expressly give their approval. Another way 
to look at the two systems is to consider them as if they set forth two 
different “default”10 regimes. The difference ultimately being the 
beneficiary of shareholder inertia: in other words, whom the regime 
favors if no shareholder vote occurs (targets in Delaware and bidders in 
the United Kingdom). 
Integral to both regimes is that each “default” can be reversed by a 
shareholder vote. Since there is money on the table once a decision to go 
hostile is taken – and hence the right incentives for the parties involved11 
                                                                                                                 
value for the benefit of shareholders in the sale of the company above the protection of 
interests of other stakeholders, including maintaining the independence of the corporate 
entity. Specifically, under Revlon the role of directors was transformed “from defenders 
of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the 
stockholders at a sale of the company.” Id. at 182. Revlon duties are triggered in certain 
limited circumstances (e.g., if a company is put on sale—either in a stock or in an asset 
deal—or if a break-up is inevitable). This Article does not analyze Revlon because 
directors of a Delaware target company have, at least from a pure legal standpoint, the 
ability to resist (potentially on a protracted basis) a hostile bid to maintain independence 
without ever becoming subject to the Revlon duties. In other words, if directors fall 
under Revlon, it is because they choose so—although sometimes it is for lack of better 
defensive options that they regrettably end up selling to a white knight. 
 10. This Article deliberately uses the term “default” in non-technical fashion. By 
“default” the Article does not refer to the generally accepted corporate law meaning of 
a statutory rule that parties can contract around either in the certificate of incorporation 
or in the bylaws. Rather, the term “default” in this Article means a regime imposed by 
the legislature that generally cannot be opted out of in the corporation’s organizational 
documents, but that shareholders can depart from by adopting certain resolutions to 
reverse such a regime. 
 11. Traditionally, proxy fights in the context of hostile acquisitions have been 
considered different than proxy fights in general, in that in the former shareholders are 
said to have the right incentives to make a decision between the offer price and the 
expected long-term value of the shares: if the offer price is considered greater than the 
value of the company staying independent, they will vote for the insurgents, otherwise 
they will stick to the incumbents. Conversely, in plain vanilla proxy fights, shareholders 
generally do not have enough information about rival teams and usually end up erring 
in favor of incumbents. See Bebchuk & Hart, supra note 8, at 2 and 5 (noting that 
“voting works better when the choice is between the incumbent’s uncertain value and 
the certain value of an offer in cash or publicly traded securities, and less well when the 
choice is between the incumbent’s uncertain value and the rival’s uncertain value”); 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy 
Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1101 (1990) (explaining that 
uncertainty in an insurgent’s quality is often a critical factor in helping incumbents win 
proxy contests).  However, this distinction may be jeopardized by the contemporary rise 
in successful proxy fights waged by activist hedge funds where no tender offer is on the 
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to determine to reverse it – the decision to adopt one regime over the 
other does not necessarily have any significant impact on the final 
outcome. That is, ultimately, such differences in anti-takeover regime 
might not really matter.12 
To be sure, to not actually matter, the regimes must be easily 
reversible. Indeed, I argue that, for the two regimes to be immaterial to 
the outcome of an acquisition, the degree of their reversibility is the 
most crucial aspect: if the parties that aim to change the legal status quo 
find that they are unduly burdened or that they do not have equal 
chances to prevail, setting the default one way or the other will have a 
tangible impact on the final outcome. This Article analyzes a series of 
factors that affect reversibility of the default including: (i) rules 
governing shareholder voting and director elections, and (ii) types of 
defenses that a target company’s board can choose to fend off a bid. 
Ultimately, both systems give shareholders some sort of control via 
a vote, yet they set a different starting point with the default. As long as 
there are no barriers to the vote or to the goals the vote purports to 
attain, that is, no barriers to reversing the default, both regimes leave 
control in the hands of shareholders. Thus, if shareholders do not have 
control in the end, it is not because of the default regime, but rather 
because factors external to the takeover regime acted as barriers to 
reversing the default. Hence, the combination of the default and these 
external factors is key in determining the final outcome (or in making a 
reversal so difficult ex ante that no private parties will bother taking 
steps to effect it). This has important implications. In particular, if we 
believe that a takeover regime gives too little or too much control over 
the outcome of an acquisition to shareholders, we need to look not at the 
initial allocation of power (the default), but at the barriers to making 
changes to the default.13 
The Article is structured as follows: Part I describes the allocation 
of corporate powers between directors and shareholders in connection 
                                                                                                                 
table and insurgents actually manage to appoint their nominees. See generally David A. 
Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Corporate Governance Update: Heightened Activist 
Attacks on Boards of Directors, N.Y. L.J. (July 24, 2014). 
 12. See infra note 86 for an assessment and contextualization of some recent 
European literature that proposes an approach similar to that applied throughout this 
Article. 
 13. In other words, it is the takeover regime’s reversibility that matters—not the 
takeover regime itself. And therefore it is imperative to identify the combination of the 
regime with the actual barriers to reversing it. 
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with the defense of a target company in Delaware.14 In particular, the 
Article provides an overview of the evolution of Delaware corporate law 
starting with the proliferation of defenses in the 1980s, then looking at 
the anti-defense movement that shareholder activists introduced at the 
beginning of the 2000s, and finally assessing the current resurgence of 
defenses in the aftermath of the financial crisis and a new rise in 
acquisitions structured via tender offers. Part II analyzes what would be 
the consequences of a “pro-shareholder Delaware.” Part III.A argues 
that the two apparently antithetical regimes are ultimately not so 
different, since both give shareholders the final say in an acquisition. 
Part III.B identifies the reversibility of the regime and the ability to 
adopt so-called structural defenses as the crucial variables that make the 
difference. Both depend on certain rules, principles, or practices of 
corporate law that are external to the actual takeover regime (the Article 
labels them as “corporate law collateral factors,” which include 
shareholders’ ability to call special meetings or act by written consent, 
supermajority rules, proxy and conflict of interest regimes, staggered 
boards, and director removability). I note that the difference is not only 
between two default regimes, but also in the potential outcome of the 
acquisition, irrespective of the actual default regime. Part III.C reports 
original empirical evidence on the number and market capitalization of 
Delaware companies that have been affected by each corporate law 
collateral factor. Part IV assesses how, in light of the corporate law 
collateral factors, the two default regimes are capable of giving 
shareholders some power in determining the outcome of the acquisition. 
Part IV concludes. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Part I describes the evolution of the takeover regime in Delaware, while it does 
not dedicate a similar description to the evolution of the U.K. regime. British rules did 
not witness the great tension and controversy that corporate America experienced since 
the 1960s with respect to hostile takeovers. In the United Kingdom, the board neutrality 
rule and shareholder primacy in takeovers were endorsed in the late 1950s as a sound 
policy solution in the aftermath of the British Aluminium takeover of 1958 and were 
subsequently adopted in 1968 in the very first version of self-regulation in the United 
Kingdom, the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. See Armour, Jacobs & Milhaupt, 
supra note 4, at 235-37. 
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I. ALLOCATING THE POWERS BETWEEN DIRECTORS AND 
SHAREHOLDERS IN THE DEFENSE OF DELAWARE TARGET COMPANIES 
A. THE PROLIFERATION OF DEFENSES IN THE 1980S AND THE RISE OF THE 
POISON PILL 
Both policy and positive law issues related to hostile takeovers 
have initially focused only on the takeover regime itself. This became 
especially apparent after courts in Delaware emphasized shareholders’ 
alleged power to oust directors and therefore their alleged control on the 
ultimate outcome of takeover contests. This part of the article describes 
how Delaware law evolved in this respect. 
Hostile takeovers have had a long-lasting impact on corporate 
America and the evolution of corporate law in the United States. The 
law of corporate acquisitions in the United States experienced a 
substantial development in the 1960s when Congress passed the 
Williams Act in 1968 as a response to a chain of hostile transactions 
known as Saturday Night Special raids.15 In such transactions purchasers 
used to seek control of companies through the following coercive 
technique: bidders would announce an offer to purchase approximately 
half of a company’s stock right after the market close on Friday, the 
offer would be kept open over the weekend and shareholders would 
tender their shares on a first-come, first-serve basis—no federal 
disclosure requirements were mandated at the time so bidders could 
decide to limit the information to a minimum. The lack of time to 
decide, the lack of information, and the first-come, first-serve 
mechanism put enormous pressure on shareholders to accept the offer at 
whatever price, even if most of the time the deal they were getting was 
not attractive. The response from the federal legislature was limited, as 
it only required bidders to provide disclosure and make tender offers 
subject to some basic procedural rules to foster equality of treatment16 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13(d)-(f), 14(d)-(f), amended by the 
Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78(a) et seq. (2012)). See Ronald J. Gilson, The Case Against Shark 
Repellent Amendments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. 
REV. 775, 775 n.2 (1982); Dale A. Oesterle, The Rise and Fall of Street Sweep 
Takeovers, 1989 DUKE L.J. 202, 217 (1989). 
 16. The most important being the requirement that corporations accept offers on a 
pro-rata basis. This functioned to avoid inequality that resulted from shareholders, in a 
typical common pool setting, racing against one another (and, in the end, their own 
interests) to tender shares before it is too late. Section 14(d)(6) of the Williams Act 
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and a minimum mandatory period17 for the offer to stay open in order to 
allow alternative bidders to enter the control contest and trigger 
auctions.18 
Early in the 1980s, with the so-called two-tier, front-end loaded 
tender offers, corporate raiders and hostile bidders managed to 
overcome the light response with which the federal legislature was able 
to shut down the Saturday Night Special raids. Two-tier tender offers 
were structured with a partial offer at some premium over the market 
price in the front-end and a low-ball take-out merger in the back-end.19 
In what some consider a typical prisoner’s dilemma situation, 
shareholders were pressured to tender their shares because they feared 
that the bid would succeed and they would be stuck with shares to be 
taken out at a very low price in the second-step merger.20 
                                                                                                                 
originally imposed the pro-rata requirement for shares tendered in the initial ten days of 
the offer; however, in 1982, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
promulgated Rule 14d-8, which extended proration to the entire offer period. See 
VICTOR BRUDNEY & WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE 
FINANCE 1010 (4th ed. 1995). 
 17. Prior to the SEC’s 1979 enactment of Rule 14e-1, which expressly requires that 
offers be made for a minimum period of twenty working days, the Williams Act 
originally imposed a minimum of seven days for any-and-all offers and ten days for 
partial offers. These requirements were considered implicit under Section 14(d)(5) and 
Section 14(d)(6). 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-5 (2012) (stating that shareholders may withdraw 
their tenders in the initial seven days of an offer); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-6 (pro-rata rule 
applies in the initial ten days of a partial offer). See RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. 
BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 947 (1995). 
 18. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 546-54 (1986). 
 19. See Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls and Professors: A Reply to 
Professor Gilson, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (2002) (“The goal of [front-end-loaded] bids 
was . . . to ‘bust-up’ the corporation and sell the pieces for a quick profit.”); see 
generally William J. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and 
Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 341, 
373 (1983) (discussing how when faced with two-tier bids, corporations should be 
allowed to adopt shark repellents to help shareholders coordinate for a common 
response to a low ball offer); Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in 
Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 298 (1974) (explaining that 
bidders have a fiduciary duty toward minority shareholders in second-step takeout 
mergers). 
 20. See Carney, supra note 19, at 348-49. In short, shareholders end up accepting 
an offer that is not in their best interest because they cannot coordinate and reject it, in 
the same way both prisoners end up confessing because they cannot agree on the story 
to tell. Absent coordination, actions taken by each shareholder in his or her self-interest 
lead to sub-optimal outcomes. See Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to 
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Companies reacted on two different fronts. On one hand, they 
(quite successfully) lobbied state legislatures to pass anti-takeover 
statutes;21 on the other hand, they “privately” responded to coercive 
offers with the adoption of a wide array of defensive tactics, including, 
most notably, shareholders’ rights plans — better known as poison pills. 
The most common and effective version of shareholders’ rights 
plans, the flip-in plan, gives stockholders (other than a potential 
acquirer) rights to purchase stock at a considerable discount if a 
potential acquirer increased its stake in the target in excess of a certain 
threshold of beneficial ownership.22 The threshold normally ranges from 
                                                                                                                 
Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 
819, 859-62 (1981) for a view critical of the common characterization of two-tier bids 
as raising prisoner’s dilemma concerns. 
 21. See Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public 
Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 457, 458-65 (1988). 
 22. The threshold is generally calculated by incorporating by reference the “group” 
definition for beneficial ownership purposes under Rule 13(d)-3 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, which aggregates purchases made by different persons acting 
together as a group (“[w]hen two or more persons act as a . . . group for the purpose of 
acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer, such syndicate or group shall 
be deemed a ‘person’ for the purposes of this subsection”). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-
5(b)(1) (2011). For a description of how, in the current market environment, such a 
definition has proven incapable to aggregate purchases by hedge funds acting via wolf 
packs, see John C. Coffee Jr. & Darius Palia, The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism: 
Evidence and Implications 23, 33-36, (ECGI Law, Working Paper No. 266, 2014), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2496518. Professors Coffee and Palia mention that 
companies might consider adopting a poison pill that “could broadly define its coverage 
so as to apply to any persons ‘acting in concert’ or ‘in conscious parallelism’ with the 
leader of the ‘wolf pack;’” such a pill would require to “define ‘group’ for purpose of 
the poison pill much more broadly than the case law under the Williams Act.” Id. at 77. 
Market players, practitioners, and courts have also focused on derivative contracts, 
synthetic ownership, and so-called empty voting. See generally Henry T. C. Hu & 
Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) 
Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006). While the court’s decision in CSX Corp. v. 
Children’s Investment Fund Management applied the anti-fraud provision in Rule 13d-
3(b) prohibiting arrangements with the purpose or effect of circumventing the beneficial 
ownership reporting rules to certain empty voting practices, it also gave derivative 
players some guidance on how to avoid tripping such anti-fraud provision; companies 
started to extend the definition of beneficial ownership to expressly cover practices 
including empty voting and derivatives. CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. 
(UK) LLP, et al., 562 F.Supp 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 
remanded, 654 C.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Charles M. Nathan & Stephen Amdur, 
Second Generation Advance Notice Bylaws and Poison Pills, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 2, 2009, 9:31 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ 
corpgov/2009/04/22/second-generation-advance-notice-bylaws-and-poison-pills/ 
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5% to 20%.23 Effectively, a plan threatens significant economic and 
voting dilution to a potential acquirer unless a target’s board takes action 
to redeem the subscription rights.24 
The pill is particularly appealing for two reasons. First, it does not 
require any shareholder action for its adoption or redemption. Therefore, 
it is a useful device for directors seeking protection from hostile 
acquisitions.25 Second, the pill really functions as a deterrent, a threat of 
dilution for an unsolicited acquirer, without the need for an actual 
transaction by a target company. The mere fact that the pill is in place 
compels a bidder to try either to negotiate a friendly deal with the board 
or to replace (or threaten to replace, if the threat would sound credible 
enough given the target’s ownership structure) the board through a 
proxy contest to get rid of the pill. This calls for persuading enough 
                                                                                                                 
(discussing transparency and accountability for synthetic equity and empty voting in 
addition to second-generation poison pills). 
 23. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of 
Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV, BUS. L. REV. 39, 56 (2012), mentioning that, based on 
a SharkRepellent dataset of early 2012, of the 805 public companies with a pill in place, 
seventy-six percent had a pill trigger at an ownership threshold of fifteen percent or 
less, and fifteen percent of such companies have pills triggered by a threshold of ten 
percent or less. The low-end of the range is a development in poison pill design that 
aims to protect a company’s tax assets. See infra note 48 and accompanying text. Note 
that, more recently, companies have started distinguishing between passive and active 
investors for pill threshold purposes: in the Sotheby’s case, the company adopted a pill 
with a 10% threshold for activist investors, and with a 20% threshold for passive 
ones—such a pill was considered valid by the Delaware Chancery Court in Third Point 
LLC. v. Ruprecht, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 64 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014). 
 24. Typically, when a pill is triggered, each shareholder (other than the potential 
acquirer) has a right to receive, upon exercise, shares having a value— based on the 
then current market price—equal to two times the exercise price of the right. See, e.g., 
GILSON & BLACK, supra note 17, at 741-42 (providing a copy of a share purchase rights 
plan to exhibit the mechanics of the pill); see Jonathan R. Macey, The Legality and 
Utility of the Shareholders Rights Bylaws, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 839-40 (1998); 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, An American Perspective on Anti-takeover Laws in the EU: The 
German Example, in REFORMING COMPANY LAW AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE 541, 
549 (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2004) (“[T]he flip-in pill operates through a 
discriminatory issuance of cheap shares that would massively dilute the hostile bidder’s 
stake.”). 
 25. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 
the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 909-10 (2002). 
However, this does not mean that shareholders are completely prevented from having a 
say on poison pills. 
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shareholders and gives those shareholders ultimate control over the 
outcome.26 
To be sure, since the mid-1980s bidders have also turned to 
litigation to challenge the validity of the pill, but that strategy did not 
prove successful notwithstanding the majority of legal and financial 
scholars opposed to defensive measures.27 When the legality of takeover 
                                                                                                                 
 26. John C. Coates IV, Ownership, Takeovers and EU Law: How Contestable 
Should EU Corporations Be?, in REFORMING COMPANY LAW AND TAKEOVER LAW IN 
EUROPE 677, 681 n.18 (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2004); see also Jordan M. Barry & 
John William Hatfield, Pills and Partisans: Understanding Takeover Defenses, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 633, 643-44 (2012).  Bidders do not necessarily have to mount a proxy fight 
every time they go hostile, as the proxy fight can operate “in the shadow.” If the 
ownership structure of the given target is such that its directors can anticipate they 
would be losing in a proxy fight, it is not uncommon that they would let the acquisition 
go through if a bidder is credible in threatening to be ready to start a proxy fight and 
replace the board. This is what happened in a couple of deals in 2012. For example, in 
GlaxoSmithKline’s acquisition of Human Genome Sciences, a deal valued at 
approximately $2.84 billion, the target agreed to be acquired by the bidder for $14.25 
per share (a hostile tender offer at $13 had been launched a few months before). The 
bidder made it clear it might solicit shareholder consents to replace the board if the 
target did not accept the offer. See Mark Scott, Glaxo Said to Aim to Replace Human 
Genome’s Board, DEALBOOK (May 31, 2012, 9:54 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2012/05/31/glaxo-said-to-be-looking-to-replace-human-genomes-board/ (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2014). Similarly, in Cypress Semiconductor’s acquisition of Ramtron 
International, a deal valued at approximately $110 million, after the bidder increased its 
hostile tender offer from $2.68 to $2.88 per share, the target ultimately agreed to be 
acquired at $3.10 per share, following the bidder’s threat to solicit written consents to 
replace the board if the target continued to reject the offer. See E-mail from T.J. 
Rodgers, President and CEO, Cypress Semiconductor Corp., to Ramtron Int’l Corp. 
Board of Directors (Aug. 6, 2012), available at http://www.cypress.com/?rID=67318 
(“If the board and management continue to entrench themselves and destroy 
stockholder value through continued poor performance and an undefined strategic 
process, we may be forced to seek out new directors who are more committed to 
maximizing value for your stockholders.”); see also Ramtron Int’l Corp., Proxy 
Statement (Schedule 14A), at 26 (Aug. 27, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/791915/000119312512368926/d368389ddfan1
4a.htm. My claim is in line with the empirical literature finding that companies and 
CEOs would rather let go or significantly amend certain deals than facing the risk of a 
defeat at a shareholder meeting: see Mario Becht et al., Does Mandatory Shareholder 
Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions? 9, 30 (ECGI Finance, Working Paper No. 422, 2014), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2443792. 
 27. Most scholars opposed defenses on the grounds that they thwarted takeovers, 
which were in their view beneficial in reducing agency costs between shareholders and 
directors. Some authors argued for a strict prohibition of any type of defenses to 
facilitate the proliferation of takeovers. This view is the so-called pure passivity 
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defenses and the pill was judicially challenged, Delaware courts ruled in 
favor of target companies, but they gave shareholders an out that may 
have initially appeared to balance the power in their favor.28 
Delaware judges allowed directors to adopt defensive measures so 
long as they can meet a two-prong test introduced in Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co. that requires that: (i) there are “reasonable grounds 
for believing that a danger or a threat to corporate policy exists” and (ii) 
“the response taken by the company . . . [is] reasonable in relation to the 
threat posed” (the latter is often referred to as the Unocal proportionality 
                                                                                                                 
standard. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a 
Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) 
[hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role]; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders’ Welfare, 36 BUS. LAW. 
1733 (1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids]. Some other authors 
posit that while directors should be prohibited from obstructing takeovers through 
defenses, they should actively pursue alternative offers so that shareholders can benefit 
from higher takeover premiums. This view is the so-called modified passivity standard. 
See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender 
Offers Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982) [hereinafter Gilson, Seeking Competitive 
Bids]; Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982). Other authors critique auctions. See, e.g., Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. 
L. REV. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions] (explaining that 
auctions do not compensate a first bidder for its target search and therefore chill first 
bidders and acquisitions more generally); Alan Schwartz, Search Theory and the 
Tender Offer Auction, 2 J. L. ECON. ORG. 229 (1986) [hereinafter Schwartz, Search 
Theory] (explaining that auctions are detrimental as they turn the information a first 
bidder gathered about a target into a public good, thereby creating a disincentive to the 
search for targets and to acquisitions); see also Alan Schwartz, Bebchuk on Minimum 
Offer Periods, 2 J. L. ECON. ORG. 271 (1986) [hereinafter Schwartz, Minimum Offer 
Periods] (responding to Bebchuk’s pro-auctions theories).  
  To be sure, several authors opposed the view that takeovers are beneficial and 
should not be discouraged. Martin Lipton, the inventor of the poison pill, has been 
historically one of the fiercest supporters of an approach that grants directors ample 
discretion to fight bids. See Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 
35 BUS. LAW 101 (1979) [hereinafter Lipton, Takeover Bids]; Martin Lipton, Corporate 
Governance in the Age of Finance Corporativism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1987) 
[hereinafter Lipton, Corporate Governance]; Lipton & Rowe, supra note 19. See also 
Kahan & Rock, supra note 25 (endorsing poison pills as a beneficial tool for 
shareholders because of greater premiums and a higher number of friendly deals); 
Jennifer Arlen, Designing Mechanisms to Govern Takeover Defense: Private 
Contracting, Legal Intervention, and Unforeseen Contingencies, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 917 
(2002); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 352 (2003). 
 28. See Unocal at 493 A.2d at 959. 
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test).29 The most important practical implication of the Unocal decision 
was on poison pills. In a subsequent case the Delaware Supreme Court 
used the Unocal test to validate the pill.30 According to the Delaware 
judges, a pre-takeover defense like the pill raises fewer concerns than 
one adopted in the heat of an actual takeover battle because “pre-
planning for the contingency of a hostile takeover might reduce the risk 
that, under the pressure of a takeover bid, management will fail to 
exercise reasonable judgment.”31 After all, the Delaware judges had 
explained in Unocal that the pill alone cannot determine the final 
outcome of the acquisition given that, “[i]f the stockholders are 
displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of 
corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out.”32 The 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Id. at 955. With the crucial decision in Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court 
established an intermediate standard of review between the entire fairness test (the 
rigorous standard for duty of loyalty cases) and the business judgment rule, which, 
according to Delaware judges, cannot apply in its pure form in takeover cases 
“[b]ecause of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own 
interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders.” Id. at 954 (footnote 
omitted). 
 30. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1346. 
 31. Id. at 1350. 
 32. Unocal at 493 A.2d at 959. This is not to say that this passage is the 
cornerstone of Delaware case law on defensive measures. After Unocal and Moran, 
several decisions over the last three decades have interpreted the Unocal proportionality 
standard with such deference to directors’ decisions that one might argue it has made 
the quoted Unocal passage less poignant than it was initially thought. See Air Prods. & 
Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011); Third Point LLC. v. Ruprecht, 
2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 64 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014). Note that this holds true even in the 
aftermath of the court’s decision in Blasius Industries, Inc., v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 
651 (Del. Ch. 1988) and its progeny. Further, this requires a “compelling justification” 
for directors who seek to thwart the shareholder franchise. Unsurprisingly, attempts to 
thwart the franchise usually occur in connection with an M&A transaction requiring a 
shareholder vote. The primary basis for the Blasius decision was that the election of 
directors is “the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial 
power rests.” Id. at 659. Not only have Delaware Courts eroded the boundaries in which 
Blasius’ higher standard of compelling justification applies in favor of some other tests. 
See Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 806-07 (Del. Ch. 2007) (formally 
applying the Blasius standard to a board decision not to delay a merger vote by twenty-
five days when it became clear there were not enough votes in favor of the merger on 
the original meeting date, but holding that such standard must be consistent with the 
Unocal framework); Keyser v. Curtis, C.A. No. 7109-VCN, 2012 WL 311453, at *13 
(Del. Ch. July 31, 2012) (applying an entire fairness test). Nevertheless, Blasius can do 
little when directors pre-plan thwarting the franchise well in advance of an M&A 
transaction. 
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court emphasized that even though the target directors won the specific 
battle, the takeover wars were far from over since shareholders retained, 
at least potentially, control on new battles to come. Delaware judges 
effectively moved the focus from tender offers to director elections.33 
When facing an unsolicited tender offer, directors can decide whether to 
preserve the company’s independence and keep the poison pill in place, 
so long as a board can be ousted by a shareholder vote. In the language 
of Delaware courts today, that means so long as the target’s response 
does not make “a bidder’s ability to wage a successful proxy contest and 
gain control [of the board] . . . ‘realistically unattainable.’”34 
Following Moran, pills became a fundamental component of U.S. 
corporate governance, and over the years targets have successfully 
resisted several attempts by shareholder plaintiffs to neutralize their 
reach.35 As Professor Ronald Gilson put it, “the poison pill has become 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It), 
26 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 491, 500-01 (2001) (criticizing the choice by Delaware judges to 
prefer elections over market dynamics). See also Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A 
Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 
857 (1993). 
 34. This is the language the Delaware Supreme Court used in Versata Enterprises 
v. Selectica, Inc., when it clarified how courts should interpret the Unitrin requirement 
by explaining that board responses must not be “preclusive.” Versata Enters., Inc. v. 
Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 601 (Del. 2010) (citing Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 
1180, 1195 (Del. Ch. 1998)); see also Airgas, 16 A.3d at 113 (following the court’s 
instructions when confronted with the Unitrin requirement). 
 35. Following Unocal and Moran, for a short period of time in the late 1980s the 
Chancery Court developed an interpretation of the Unocal test based on the allocation 
of powers between directors and shareholders in the decision on the outcome of a bid: 
absent a structurally coercive offer, that is, in the face of an all-cash, all-shares offer, 
where the only threat a board can claim is really price inadequacy and shareholder 
myopia (the latter, also known as “substantive coercion”), directors could not “just say 
no” and maintain the pill in place. Cf. City Capital Assoc. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 
787, 799-800 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“To acknowledge that directors may employ the recent 
innovation of ‘poison pills’ to deprive shareholders of the ability effectively to choose 
to accept a noncoercive offer, after the board has had a reasonable opportunity to 
explore or create alternatives or attempt to negotiate on the shareholders’ behalf, would 
. . . be so inconsistent with widely shared notions of appropriate corporate governance 
as to threaten to diminish the legitimacy and authority of our corporate law.”), 
overruled by Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). 
However, this shareholder/bidder-friendly approach did not last long. In Paramount 
Communications, the Delaware Supreme Court overturned the Interco ruling when it 
made clear that a court cannot “substitut[e] its judgment as to what is a ‘better’ deal for 
that of a corporation’s board of directors.” Paramount Commc’ns, 571 A.2d at 1153. In 
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ubiquitous – every public company either has adopted a pill or can adopt 
one if a hostile offer is made.”36 Indeed, one of the most important 
aspects of pills is that they can be adopted easily by the board: all 
companies have a poison pill plan “on-the-shelf” that can be approved 
quickly if and when circumstances so require.37 The other very 
important characteristic of a poison pill, which I address further in Part 
III.B.2, is its “structural” nature:38 the pill does not involve the taking of 
any action having financial or operational effect on the target—it solely 
acts as a deterrent on a bidder who will never decide to trigger it given 
its dilutive effects.39 The absence of any financial or operational effects 
of such a defense allows stockholders to determine whether they want 
the tender offer to succeed without worrying about the long-term effects 
of the defense on the target stock. 
                                                                                                                 
the following decade, courts emboldened this pro-target reading of Unocal. In 1995, the 
Delaware Supreme Court decision widened the scope of board discretion in the face of 
an unsolicited bid. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). Under 
Unitrin, substantive coercion, which is the showing that shareholders could accept an 
inadequate offer because of “ignorance or mistaken belief[,]” was sufficient for 
directors to show the existence of a threat. Id. at 1385. In order to fail the second prong 
under Unocal, that is, the proportionality test, the board’s actions must be “draconian, 
by being either preclusive of coercive[,]” and, if the “response was not draconian, the 
Court must then determine whether it fell ‘within a range of reasonable responses to the 
threat’ posed.” Id. at 1367; Airgas, 16 A.3d at 92-93 (quoting Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 
1367). 
 36. Gilson, supra note 33, at 501. 
 37. See John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique 
of the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV 271, 289 (2000) [hereinafter Coates, 
Takeover Defenses] 
[A]ll Delaware firms (except those few with other governance terms 
that would impede pill adoption) have had a shadow pill in place, 
witting or not. Takeovers of such firms have been restrained by a set 
of ‘shadow restrictions’—the expectation of a pill’s adoption and 
subsequent effects—on transfer of control to a hostile bidder. The 
adoption of an actual pill by any given firm only brings this shadow 
pill into the light, but does nothing to change the odds that the target 
will be acquired or not. 
 38. See infra Part III.B.2 and accompanying text for a definition of structural as 
opposed to transactional defenses. 
 39. See id. for a discussion of the “structural” nature of a poison pill. 
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B. ANTI-PILL SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM IN THE EARLY 2000S 
In the early 2000s, pills became unpopular among market 
participants. Most notably, pills lost their appeal to activist institutional 
investors40 who began trying to bolster shareholders’ control over 
corporate acquisitions by actually requiring that shareholders have a say 
not just at the proxy contest stage (the proxy contest in which they can 
replace the board with a new board that redeems the pill), but also at the 
stage of the pill adoption (or renewal). 
Several non-binding stockholders’ proposals on rights plans were 
put forward, typically requesting that a plan expire within a period of 
time (normally, no longer than one year) in the absence of stockholder 
ratification.41 The proxy firm Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) 
began issuing voting guidelines aimed at chilling the adoption or 
renewal of pills. In 2004, ISS recommended its clients, institutional 
shareholders of corporations, withhold their votes at the re-election of 
incumbent directors of a company if, following a company’s previous 
annual meeting, a poison pill was approved or renewed by the company 
without shareholder approval.42 Starting with the 2010 proxy season, 
ISS recommended its clients vote against or withhold their votes for 
directors who voted (i) to adopt a pill with a term of more than twelve 
months, (ii) to renew a pill of any duration without shareholder 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Compare MARIA CARMEN S. PINNELL, IRRC GOVERNANCE RESEARCH SERV., 
2003 BACKGROUND REPORT E: POISON PILLS 1 (2003) (on file with author) (noting that 
starting in 2002 activists waged war against poison pills), and Poison Pill Adoption on 
the Decline, SHARKREPELLENT.NET (Oct. 3, 2003), https://www.sharkrepellent.net/ 
request?an=dt.getPage&st=1&pg=/pub/rs_20031003.html&rnd=558416 (noting that 
“the increased efforts of shareholder activists along with an enhanced awareness of 
corporate governance issues resulted in 2003 setting a record for the number of 
shareholder proposals to redeem poison pills that have passed”), with John Laide, 
Rethinking the Role of the Poison Pill?, SHARKREPELLENT.NET (Sept. 17, 2008), 
https://www.sharkrepellent.net/pub/rs_20080916.html (noting how the trend against 
pills was actually experiencing a push-back in 2008 as companies felt more vulnerable 
given the depressed stock prices in the aftermath of the financial crisis). 
 41. There were seventy-eight non-binding proposals in 2003, forty-nine in 2004, 
and twenty-five by September 1, 2005. On each of those years the approval rate 
averaged around 60%. INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., 2005 POSTSEASON REPORT: 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT CROSSROADS 8 (2005) (on file with author). 
 42. INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., US PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES SUMMARY 
app. D (ISS Proxy Voting Guidelines Summary) (2004) (on file with author). 
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approval, or (iii) to make a material adverse change to any existing pill 
without shareholder approval.43 
In parallel, activists sought to pass binding bylaw shareholder 
proposals on poison pills, whereby the bylaw would limit board powers 
with respect to poison pills and would not be subject to modification by 
the board without shareholder approval. A case in point was Professor 
Lucian Bebchuk’s battle with CA, Inc. in 2006: the Harvard professor 
made a shareholder proposal for a bylaw to inhibit the board from 
adopting or maintaining a poison pill (other than by unanimous vote) 
and to limit the term of a board adopted plan to twelve months without 
shareholder approval.44 After CA responded that the bylaw would not be 
valid under Delaware law, Bebchuk sued the company in Delaware for a 
ruling in favor of the bylaw. The Chancery Court ultimately dismissed 
the claim on procedural grounds as unripe for consideration, since the 
proposed bylaw had not yet been adopted.45 
In part because of pressure from shareholder activists, but also 
because – as John Coates demonstrated46 – having or not having a pill in 
place during “peaceful times” is irrelevant since a company can always 
adopt one quickly after it becomes subject to an unsolicited acquisition 
attempt,47 the overall number of companies with a traditional flip-in 
plan48 in place significantly declined by the beginning of the 2010s. In 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Matteo Tonello, Poison Pills in 2011, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON GOVERNANCE & 
FIN. REG. (Apr. 3, 2011, 9:49 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/ 
04/03/poison-pills-in-2011 (noting that, “[u]nder the revised guidelines, a director’s 
voting record on the company’s poison pill may factor into ISS’s recommendation 
concerning that director every time he or she is up for election[,]” whereas prior to 
those guidelines, “ISS would have made a voting recommendation only in the year that 
the pill was implemented or renewed.”). For a description of how effective ISS’s 
recommendations have been with respect to the way companies go about decisions on 
takeover defenses, see Coffee & Palia, supra note 22, at 17 (noting that “[o]ne measure 
of ISS’s influence is that most public companies in order to comply with ISS’s 
guidelines have either redeemed their poison pill or adopted a poison pill that is 
consistent with ISS’s guidelines (and thus has a duration of one year or less)”). 
 44. See Gordon Smith, Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., CONGLOMERATE.ORG (June 16, 2006), 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2006/06/bebchuk_v_ca_in.html (analyzing the 
Bebchuk ruling). 
 45. Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A. 2d 737, 738 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
 46. See Coates, Takeover Defenses, supra note 37, at 287-88. 
 47. Cf. Coffee & Palia, supra note 22, at 79 (noting that companies might generally 
prefer to lay low rather than confronting a proxy advisor). 
 48. This Article primarily focuses on pills engineered to deter, obstruct, and restrict 
unsolicited takeovers. In corporate practice those are the flip-in plans. However, in the 
second half of the 2000s, companies started to adopt new types or variations of pills to 
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early 2011, less than 900 companies had a pill in effect (there were 2200 
a decade earlier).49 
Thus, despite resistance from shareholder activists, management 
retains the ability to adopt poison pills quickly, even if the use of long-
term pills has declined. At least in theory, shareholders do retain the 
ability to oust boards and their accompanying pills, a power that 
Delaware judges at least purportedly find meaningful; however, 
although Delaware judges expressed faith in shareholders’ ability to 
exercise control in takeovers via director elections, directors made use 
of new devices external to the takeover regime. The most potent and 
most heavily debated of these new devices has been the use of staggered 
boards, to which I turn in Section I.C. 
                                                                                                                 
pursue goals other than fending-off hostile bids, such as: preserving a company’s tax 
assets in the form of net operating losses. The so-called NOL pill, which was validated 
in Versata, aims to avoid an occurrence that would impair the tax asset, such as an 
“ownership change” for purposes of Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 
as amended, by lowering the trigger of the pill to thresholds as low as 4.99% (as only 
shareholders beneficially owning at least 5% are generally considered for the ownership 
change analysis). Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A3d 586 (Del. 2010). 
Compare id., with eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 8 (Del. Ch. 
2010), in which two of the founders of Craigslist, Inc., for the express purpose of 
protecting the company’s corporate culture, sought to implement a poison pill triggered, 
among other things, by an increase of ownership by a mere 0.01%. The court found that 
the preservation of corporate culture is not a valid threat under Unocal, and therefore 
such a poison pill is not valid. See generally Joseph M. Grieco, The Ever-Evolving 
Poison Pill: The Pill in Asset Protection and Closely-Held Corporation Cases, 36 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 625, 637-44 (2011); Tonello, supra note 43, at 10-11 nn.14-25 and 
accompanying text; Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 23, at 56. 
 49. See Tonello, supra note 43, at 10 nn.6-7 and accompanying text.  Following 
Coates’ suggestion, one should take this data with a grain of salt, especially if we 
consider that, only a few years ago, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, 
commentators and practitioners noticed a steep increase in the use of the pill for 
defensive purposes. Coates, Takeover Defenses, supra note 39. Indeed, with the 
collapse of financial markets around 2008 and 2009, companies believed their stock had 
become systematically undervalued and felt more vulnerable, considering how much 
cheaper it had become for an unsolicited bidder to grab a controlling block. See Laide, 
supra note 40; Jane K. Storero, Poison Pills on the Rise . . . A Reaction to Shareholder 
Activism or a Signal of the Turbulent Financial Times?, 12 NO. 2 M & A LAW. 17, 17 
(2009). 
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C. TAKEOVER LEGAL BATTLES IN THE 2000S: BINDING BYLAW 
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS ON POISON PILLS AND STAGGERED BOARDS 
Over the last few years, the ever-animated legal and policy debate 
on takeover defenses and their long-standing effects on U.S. corporate 
governance – one of the most vehemently argued topics since the 1980s 
– has been, once again, at the forefront of corporate lawyers’ attention. 
In the last decade, shareholder activists, mainly hedge funds and 
other institutional investors, sought to shake up Delaware rules on 
takeover defenses and, more generally, the allocation of powers between 
shareholders and directors. While ISS voting policies to dissuade 
directors from adopting pills were a response by market participants to 
pill boardroom practices,50 other strategies raised new legal questions. 
On one hand, the launch of binding bylaw shareholder proposals on 
poison pills triggered a debate on whether such devices are valid under 
Delaware law and whether embracing them would constitute sound 
corporate policy.51 
On the other hand, the rise of a defensive tactic consisting of the 
combined use of poison pills and staggered boards caught the attention 
of leading scholars, who described it as a “powerful antitakeover 
force,”52 because it renders the winning of a proxy fight by a bidder – 
and therefore shareholder choice – insufficient to replace the majority of 
the board and redeem the pill. In a typical staggered board under 
Delaware law, with one-third of the directors coming up for reelection 
each year, in order to gain control of the board an insurgent would need 
to win two elections and as a result have to wait at least one year. This 
                                                                                                                 
 50. The ultimate effectiveness of which is arguable, since directors have the ability 
to adopt pills subsequently on an as-needed basis. 
 51. See infra Part II.B on the allocation of decision-making powers between 
directors and shareholders; see generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy 7 
(UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper, No. 10-06, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1615838 [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy]. (“[A] 
publicly held corporation’s decision-making structure is principally an authority-based 
one. …[T]he statutory separation of ownership and control means that shareholders 
have essentially no power to initiate corporate action and, moreover, are entitled to 
approve or disapprove only a very few board actions. The statutory decision-making 
model thus is one in which the board acts and shareholders, at most, react.”). 
 52. This expression was coined by Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV and 
Guhan Subramanian in The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, 
Evidence & Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 944 (2002) (proposing that “[c]ourts should 
not allow managers to continue blocking a takeover bid after they lose one election 
conducted over an acquisition offer”). 
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would “impose[] an additional and substantial cost that makes the ballot 
box route extremely difficult.”53 Such devices kept academics and 
corporate practitioners busy until, in early 2011, the Delaware Chancery 
Court ruled in favor of the target directors in Airgas.54 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id. at 923. 
 54. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011). In 
Airgas, the Delaware Chancery Court refused to compel the board of the target to 
redeem the pill following the bidder’s successful attempt to replace a slate of directors 
after a proxy fight. Airgas was widely publicized, in part, because Delaware courts 
decided not to invalidate takeover defenses that combine staggered boards and poison 
pills. 
  The extensive analysis by then-Chancellor William Chandler of how to apply 
the doctrines established by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Unitrin, and how to 
differentiate Unitrin from Interco built upon former Chancellor William Allen’s iconic 
statement in TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp. that, “A corporation is not a 
New England town meeting; directors, not shareholders have responsibilities to 
manage the business and affairs of the corporation, subject however to a fiduciary 
obligation.” CIV. A. Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *8 n.14 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 
1989) (emphasis in Airgas,16 A.3d at 102). See also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 
651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. 
Ch. 1988), overruled by Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 140 (Del. 
1990).  Following an analysis of the threat of inadequate price (the first prong under 
Unocal), the perils of an ownership structure that mutates following the announcement 
of a bid with the rise of arbitrageurs, based on prior opinions by the Supreme Court of 
Delaware (on which Chandler expressed some personal skepticism, yet acknowledged 
the nature of controlling precedents of such opinions), the Chancery Court ruled that the 
pill may be used with other defensive tactics and still be a reasonable response to a 
perceived threat—the pill may be “preclusive for now,” but not “preclusive forever.” 
Airgas, 16 A.3d at 104, 108, 113. Chancellor Chandler concluded that “[i]n order to 
have any effectiveness, pills do not—and can not—have a set expiration date. . . . This 
case . . . endorse[s] . . . Delaware’s long-understood respect for reasonably exercised 
managerial discretion, so long as boards are found to be acting in good faith and in 
accordance with their fiduciary duties . . . .” Id. at 129.  The fact that the board was 
comprised of a majority of independent directors (including three directors nominated 
by the bidder, who ultimately voted in alignment with the fellow board members not to 
redeem the pill), played a crucial role in the determination that the response was not 
preclusive, given that, per Unitrin, it fell within a range of reasonableness. 
  Airgas was yet another victory for pro-management supporters who cite short-
termism as a central concern of corporate law and call for further insulation of boards of 
directors from shareholder decision-making via corporate collateral factors such as 
staggered boards. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves 
Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1653 (2013); see also Mark J. Roe, 
Corporate Short-Termism — In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 
977 (2013) for a critique of the call to diminish shareholders’ role in decision-making. 
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Rather than following the policy proposal that a staggered board 
should be compelled to redeem a pill if a bidder wins the first election 
and appoints one-third of the board,55 Airgas has in fact confirmed the 
validity (at least for fact-patterns in which the newly-appointed directors 
vote in the same direction as the other incumbent directors)56 of the 
“powerful antitakeover force” consisting of the combination of a 
staggered board with a poison pill. Delaware courts do not believe that 
such a combined device would make a proxy fight “realistically 
unattainable[,]” and, therefore, the defense cannot be considered 
“preclusive” to the launch of a proxy fight. Consequently, staggered 
boards and pills pass the validity test under Unocal and its progeny.57 
Nonetheless, the practical implications of such a decision are 
effectively limited to companies that already have a staggered board in 
place.58 
II. THE TAKEOVER PENDULUM IN DELAWARE: WOULD THERE EVER 
BE A “PRO-SHAREHOLDER DELAWARE”? 
A. WHO TO DECIDE, DIRECTORS OR SHAREHOLDERS? 
Thus far, the analysis shows how Delaware takeover law is still a 
hotly contested issue more than thirty years after the first wave of hostile 
bids in the 1980s. Despite the extensive debate, Delaware remains a 
                                                                                                                 
The role played by short-term oriented, deal-driven arbitrageurs in an attempted hostile 
acquisition such as Airgas is precisely the type of action pro-management advocates use 
as justification to support the use of corporate law collateral factors that alter the 
reversibility of a default regime. See infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 55. Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 52. 
 56. It will be interesting to see if in the future a polarized staggered board will 
drive to a different outcome. In fact, one can wonder whether the Airgas judge would 
have reached the same conclusion if the directors elected by the bidder, instead of 
siding with the majority of the board in rejecting the offer, voted in favor of the bid and 
against maintaining the poison pill. To some extent, one can see that it was less 
problematic for the judge to rely on the business judgment of a board in which even the 
Air Products-elected directors did not believe the offer price was fair, than to overturn 
the board’s decision and compel redemption of the pill when no director thought it was 
in the best interest of the company and its shareholders. 
 57. In other words, Delaware courts validated structures that virtually insulate 
boards and make highly unlikely the chance that a bidder can singlehandedly remove 
the directors and redeem the pill, which Unocal initially left open as a viable hostile 
strategy for a bidder. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 
1985). 
 58. See infra Part III.B.1.e and III.C. 
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largely pro-target environment, and has not strayed from that path over 
the last three decades. This is not surprising when considered from a 
basic public choice perspective. Takeover law in Delaware is mainly 
made by judges who are well-aware of the potentially negative 
consequences for Delaware corporate law primacy of case law that sides 
with shareholders and bidders.59 Indeed, the pill remains a cornerstone 
of American capitalism, and Delaware law remains highly deferential to 
boards. Even where its sole reason to oppose – in the Unocal taxonomy, 
the threat – is price inadequacy, whether real or alleged (i.e., 
shareholders’ ignorance and mistaken belief regarding the stock’s long-
term value),60 “a board that in good faith believes that a hostile offer is 
inadequate may ‘properly employ[] a poison pill as a proportionate 
defensive response to protect its stockholders from a ‘low ball’ bid’.”61 
Takeover analysis is not limited to interpretation. In fact, it extends 
to the underlying merits and consequences of adopting one approach 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 625-26 (2003) 
(mentioning the November 1988 Wachtell Lipton client alert memo, which was sent in 
the wake of the pro-bidder decision in Interco and advised its clients to consider 
reincorporating outside of Delaware should Delaware continue to rule against targets, 
which in fact did not happen); Roe, Takeover Politics, supra note 2, at 340-41, 353 
(worried about the potential loss of primacy in the market for corporate charters, 1980s 
Delaware policymakers ruled for targets); Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of 
Takeovers Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 120-22 (1987); Romano, supra note 21, at 467. 
 60. This often translates into “substantive coercion,” an expression introduced by 
Professors Ronald Gilson and Reiner Kraakman to describe a situation where (i) 
management actually believes the offer price is inadequate, and (ii) shareholders do not 
trust management’s ability either to assess the circumstances objectively or to deliver 
on the expected long-term value. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner Kraakman, Delaware’s 
Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is there Substance to Proportionality 
Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 260 (1989). Substantive coercion was soon interpreted by 
the Delaware judiciary more loosely. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 
A.3d 48, 95-103 (Del. Ch. 2011); see also Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE L.J. 621, 633-35 (2003) for a critique of 
substantive coercion as a justification for director resistance to takeovers. 
 61. Airgas, 16 A.3d at 112-13. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 
A.2d 1140, 1150 n.12 (Del. 1990) (“The Supreme Court has unequivocally ‘endorse[d 
the] conclusion that it is not a breach of faith for directors to determine that the present 
stock market price of shares is not representative of true value or that there may indeed 
be several market values for any corporation’s stock.’”); see also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. 
Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1376 (Del. 1995) (“[T]he directors of a Delaware 
corporation have the prerogative to determine that the market undervalues its stock and 
to protect its stockholders from offers that do not reflect the long-term value of the 
corporation under its present management plan.”). 
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over the other. It includes consideration of (i) the pros and cons of 
binding pill shareholder bylaws; (ii) the pros and cons of combining 
pills and staggered boards; and ultimately, (iii) who should decide the 
fate of an unsolicited takeover attempt. 
1. The Reasons for Letting Shareholders Decide 
For many years now, a pro-shareholder approach, one in which 
directors must obtain shareholder approval to adopt or renew a pill (or 
any other defensive measure for that matter, which would in turn make 
the regime resemble those European jurisdictions that have adopted the 
board neutrality rule), has been advocated by scholars and shareholder 
activists and resisted by Delaware judges and most practitioners.62 
Adherents to the pro-shareholder approach believe that letting 
shareholders determine the outcome of a contested acquisition is 
beneficial for several reasons, including that: (i) directors are conflicted 
and cannot express candid judgment as they face the risk of being 
replaced by the bidder;63 (ii) the risk of director entrenchment is 
alleviated, which in the long run increases the likelihood of takeovers, 
which in turn curbs agency costs by forcing directors to maintain a high 
enough stock price to make an unsolicited acquisition less likely;64 (iii) 
without board vetoes, and assuming mechanisms are in place to ensure 
undistorted choice by shareholders (i.e., a shareholder vote on the actual 
defense), the person who values the target the greatest is the most likely 
to seize corporate control, which is a desirable outcome from an 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 63. This is the view reflected by those who endorse the so-called “pure passivity” 
approach (concluding that directors should stay passive and not erect any defenses in 
the face of a bid). See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, supra note 27; 
Schwartz, Search Theory, supra note 27; Subramanian, supra note 60.  This is also the 
view reflected by those endorsing the “modified passivity” approach (concluding that 
directors should erect no defenses other than seeking better offers and auctioning the 
company). See, e.g., Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids, supra note 27; Bebchuk, supra 
note 27. 
 64. Henry Manne was the first prominent author who championed takeovers in the 
mid-1960s, precisely because of their disciplinary function. Henry G. Manne, Mergers 
and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965). Fellow 
Chicagoans Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel endorsed the 
disciplinary hypothesis years later. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, supra 
note 27. Professor Subramanian takes a substantially similar approach. See also 
Subramanian, supra note 60. 
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efficiency standpoint;65 and (iv) the absence of board vetoes increases 
M&A activity by forcing directors to consider acquisition proposals, 
which they would otherwise reject outright if they could veto the 
acquisition upfront. This increases the likelihood that deals will be 
ultimately negotiated and will promote better synergies and economies 
of scale and/or scope.66 
2. Do Directors Decide Better than Shareholders for Shareholders? 
Conversely, those who support the current state-of-the-art in 
Delaware believe that any departure from the current rules would have a 
deep negative impact on corporate governance. Some supporters 
actually challenge the view that boosting takeover activity is 
beneficial.67 Traditionally, opponents of shareholder-choice have argued 
that synergies and market-generated reactions against mismanagement 
only partially explain the takeover phenomenon. They maintain that 
acquisitions are inherently redistributive. As takeovers generate wealth, 
the wealth transfers to shareholders at the expense of creditors,68 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in 
Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1764-70 (1985) [hereinafter Bebchuk, 
Toward Undistorted Choice]; Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in 
Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973, 981-88, 991-94 (2002) [hereinafter 
Bebchuk, Case Against Board Veto]. 
 66. See G. William Schwert, Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?, 
55 J. FIN. 2599, 2600 (2000) (noting that deals can change from hostile to friendly and 
vice versa); Subramanian, supra note 61, at 684, for a critique of the claim that friendly 
acquisitions in the United States are negotiated in the shadow of a hostile takeover bid; 
see also Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1907, 1925 (2013) (noting that there were approximately three thousand 
friendly deals in the United States between 1996 and 2000, in comparison to only 
ninety-two hostile attempts in the same period: “[a]cademics’ stubborn focus on the 
‘problem’ of managerial resistance to hostile takeovers is remarkable, considering the 
irrelevance of takeover defenses in a world in which managers are incentivized to think 
like shareholders.”). I believe that Rock’s remark is not conclusive, in that it is 
untestable: there is no way of knowing how many friendly deals would have occurred 
had Delaware (and other states) adopted a more shareholder friendly approach. 
 67. Lipton & Rowe, supra note 19, at 7 (“The opponents also observed that many 
hostile bids were opportunistic attempts to buy assets on the cheap, and that there was 
no empirical evidence that such takeovers were always (or ever) good for the 
economy.”) (emphasis in original). 
 68. See, e.g., Morrey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 
BUS. LAW. 413 (1986). 
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employees,69 local communities,70 target shareholders themselves,71 
bidder’s shareholders,72 and other stakeholders.73 It is far from the 
purpose of this article to address whether any of these constituencies 
should – either under applicable law or from a policy perspective – be 
protected by directors. However, it is sufficient to say that under this 
line of reasoning, denying directors veto powers with respect to 
unsolicited takeovers would inundate companies and the market as a 
whole with acquisition activity, rendering them incapable of countering 
corporate raiders. 
Over the years supporters of takeover defenses have gradually 
abandoned the position that directors should protect non-shareholder 
                                                                                                                 
 69. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile 
Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 34-37, 41-42 
(Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988). 
 70. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999). 
 71. Investor exploitation, by way of wealth transfers from target shareholders to the 
bidder, occurs as a result of several factors. One cause is the inherent pressure to tender 
that tender-offer mechanics structurally facilitate. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Pressure 
to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 911, 933 (1987) 
[hereinafter Bebchuk, Pressure to Tender] (noting that a shareholder vote, rather than 
defenses, should remedy such pressure). Another cause depends on the inability of the 
market to adequately price potential target corporations. This in turn can either depend 
on market myopia, noise, or inefficiencies, or it can occur because the potential target’s 
stock price is systematically discounted compared to its fundamental value as a going 
concern. See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller, Fashions, Fads, and Bubbles in Financial Markets, 
in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 56 (John 
C. Coffee, Jr., et al. eds., 1988); Lipton, Takeover Bids, supra note 27; see also Reinier 
Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of “Discounted” Share 
Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891 (1988) for an example of the 
latter approach. 
 72. Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597 
(1989) (explaining that managerial optimism, error, winner’s curse, and agency costs 
often push a bidder to overpay at its stockholders’ expense); James Fanto, Braking the 
Merger Momentum: Reforming Corporate Law Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 BUFF. L. 
REV. 249, 287 (2001) (explaining that peer pressure motivates CEOs to engage in 
acquisitions); Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 
197 (1986) (discussing how decision-makers of the bidders tend to overestimate the 
value of targets at the expense of a bidder firm’s shareholders). 
 73. But see Barry & Hatfield, supra note 26, at 659 (explaining that “[w]hile one 
might believe, a priori, that acquirers gain utility from takeovers at the expense of other 
parties—such as creditors, workers, customers (in the form of market power). . . , or the 
government (in the form of tax savings. . . )—empirical studies have generally found 
that these factors do not adequately explain takeover gains”). 
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constituencies. They now primarily focus on shareholders’ interests; 
namely long-term shareholder value.74 In their view, without an 
adequate board response, targets would be subject to exploitation by 
bidders who would lure shareholders with premiums that do not fully 
represent the real value of the company, and could therefore acquire 
companies at lower prices.75 
In particular, as target’s counsel argued in Airgas, a shareholder 
choice system would ultimately give arbitrageurs (“arbs”) the final say 
on the fate of the company at the expense of long-term shareholders. 
Indeed, following the announcement of a bid, the ownership structure of 
a target typically changes. For example, in Airgas, instead of waiting for 
                                                                                                                 
 74. See Lipton & Rowe, supra note 19, at 7; Dale A. Oesterle, The Negotiation 
Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the Delaware Supreme Court, 72 CORNELL L. 
REV. 117, 120-21 (1986); David D. Haddock et al., Property Rights in Assets and 
Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REV. 701, 705-06 (1987); see also Subramanian, 
supra note 60. 
 75. This is true even if the offer does not have any features of so-called structural 
coercion (e.g., a partial offer or a two-tier front-end loaded tender offer) that de facto 
disappeared from takeovers of U.S. companies in the aftermath of the takeover boom of 
the 1980s as a result of the invention of the pill, the case law validating defenses against 
structurally coercive offers, as well as, to a more limited extent, the federal intervention 
of the Williams Act and the SEC rules passed in the 1980s. See supra notes 18-22 and 
accompanying text. Consequently, the takeover market adopted typical coercive 
acquisition techniques, such as screening out partial bids. Subsequently, the takeover 
market permitted shareholders to tender their shares during the “second round of 
tendering” even after the bid period has closed. This technique suppresses any pressure 
on the shareholder to tender (with an option to tender the shares in the second round, a 
shareholder who opposes the bid can wait until the first round of offers closes and will 
decide to tender only if the offer ultimately succeeds; without an option to tender in the 
second round, that same opposing shareholder would have been pressured to tender by 
the risk that the offer succeeds and he or she gets stuck with minority shares). Second 
rounds are generally mandatory under U.K. regulation, unless an offer is unconditional 
as to acceptances from the outset. See PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY 
CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, Rule 31.4, at N1 (11d ed. 2013), available at 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf.  They have 
been imported as best practice in the U.S. pursuant to SEC Rule 14d-11 under the 
Williams Act. See generally Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal 
Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, supra note 65, at 1797-98 (noting how second 
rounds involve free-rider problems, in that more than a stockholder who approves of the 
offer would rather wait and to see the results of the offer and only at that point would 
decide whether to tender: this is because of the transaction costs associated with 
tendering during the first round and not having the stock available in the interim 
period). 
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a potentially greater, yet undetermined, offer price, a substantial amount 
of shareholders chose to cash-in by selling to arbs at the post-
announcement market price.76 Shareholders receive smaller premiums 
                                                                                                                 
 76. The arbs story played a significant role in Airgas where, following the 
announcement of the takeover by Air Products, arbs and other event-driven investors 
started to purchase significant stakes in the target stock that ultimately allowed them to 
own approximately 46% of the company. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 
A.3d 48, 118 (Del. Ch. 2011).  “Airgas’s board members testified that the concepts of 
coercion, threat, and the decision whether or not to redeem the pill were nonetheless 
‘implicit’ in the board’s discussions due to their knowledge that a large percentage of 
Airgas’s stock is held by merger arbitrageurs who have short-term interests and would 
be willing to tender into an inadequate offer.” Id. at 105. 
  Short-term oriented investing as represented by event-driven, merger 
arbitrageurs is central to understanding pro-target advocates’ support for anti-takeover 
measures like poison pills, staggered boards, and delayed shareholder elections. Much 
of the debate in corporate law regarding board-insulation revolves around the problem 
of short-termism. Since the inception of the 1980s takeover boom, Martin Lipton, the 
most prominent voice in management advocacy, has been citing investors’ short-
termism as a primary justification for empowering directors with veto power in the 
context of hostile acquisitions. See, e.g., Lipton, Takeover Bids, supra note 27, at 104-
05. Lipton argues that the policy debate regarding corporate governance should be 
framed as: “[w]hether the long-term interests of the nation’s corporate system and 
economy should be jeopardized . . . to benefit speculators” only interested in quick 
profits. Id. at 104 (emphasis omitted). Insulating boards of directors from shareholder 
pressure, and thus limiting shareholder voice, the argument goes, best serves the long-
term interests of the corporation and its long-term shareholders. See also Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1735, 1744-51 (2006). But see Bebchuk, supra note 55, at 1637 (using empirical 
evidence to argue against the conventional short-termist arguments supporting board 
insulation via poison pills and corporate law collateral factors). 
  In Airgas, short-termism concerns played an important role in the court’s 
ultimate decision to allow the board of directors to maintain the poison pill despite 
having lost the first election. Airgas, 26 A.3d at 108-12. Central to the court’s decision 
was testimony from experts on both sides of the legal battle that short-term arbs “would 
be happy to tender their shares at [the offer] price regardless of the potential long-term 
value of the company.” Id. at 111; Roe, supra note 54, at 990 (detailing then-Chancellor 
Chandler’s analysis regarding the role of short-termism and deal arbs in Airgas). 
Perhaps not surprisingly, other members of the Delaware judiciary have expressed 
concerns over investor short-termism in extrajudicial writings. Delaware judges (former 
and current) have stressed in scholarly articles the dangers of short-termism and the 
need to further insulate boards of directors for long-term benefits. See Jack Jacobs, 
“Patient Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive It?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1645, 1649-50 (2011) (expressing concern over short-term oriented investors and 
their effect on long-term value creation); William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. 
Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover Debate: A Mediation on Bridging the Conceptual 
Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1096-100 (2002) (proposing triennial director 
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when they act prematurely, but early action effectively transfers the deal 
consummation risk to the arbs, who will not realize a benefit unless the 
deal closes. Pro-target advocates argue that fostering shareholder-choice 
in takeovers only protects the arbs, who care more about deal 
consummation than the long-term value reflected in the price ultimately 
paid by the bidder. 
B. CAN SHAREHOLDERS DECIDE ANYTHING AT ALL? 
An important aspect of Delaware’s management-friendly, pro-
target legal environment, particularly in light of the recent debate on 
shareholder pill bylaws, is that opponents of a shareholder-choice 
system would not allow a company to adopt restrictions on pills 
voluntarily without board confirmation, as shareholders alone cannot 
legislate to that effect in the bylaws.77 While boards may adopt these 
                                                                                                                 
elections to mitigate short-termism issues and foster long-term value creation); Leo E. 
Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can 
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also 
Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 1-3 (2010) (discussing the tension between 
short-term investment horizons and the long-term best interests of corporations); Leo E. 
Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New 
Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 687-90 (2005) (discussing 
concerns over short-termism in relation to corporate takeover policy). 
 77. Delaware corporate law is generally comprised of enabling rules out of which 
private parties can contract; however, some authors suggest that Section 141(a) of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) requires that a board decision on the 
bid (and on the defenses to fight it) be taken at the actual time of the bid and that any 
imposition by a shareholder bylaw to tie directors’ hands for the future would run afoul 
of such rule, in that directors would not be in a position to discharge their duties freely 
at the time the corporation faced a hostile bid. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 141(a) (2014). 
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary 
Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Preliminary 
Reflections]; see generally Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 52, at 7 (noting 
that of the two extremes of the decision-making models, publicly held corporations 
principally tend to operate on an authority-based platform, leaving shareholders with 
little power); CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232-35 (Del. 
2008) (noting that limits to directors’ managerial powers under Section 141(a) of the 
DGCL need a “specific authorization in either the statute or the certificate of 
incorporation”). This is a peril that does not seem to bother shareholders’ advocates 
who argue that if the bid were not high enough, shareholders would authorize the board 
to adopt the pill. Their critics’ rebuttal is that typically, at the time the bid is presented, 
the shareholder base is largely comprised of arbs whose long positions were created in 
anticipation of an upcoming sale of shares regardless of the adequacy of the presented 
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restrictions on their own,78 they have never done so, at least expressly in 
terms of binding and irrevocable commitments with respect to future pill 
adoption, maintenance, or renewal;79 under pressure from institutional 
investors, the farthest they normally go is simply not renewing a pill or 
redeeming an existing one,80 but they do not tie directors’ hands 
indefinitely. 
This debate largely misses a critical nuance: the anti-takeover 
regime itself plays a role that is not as important as scholars have 
portrayed it. Consider the following: if Delaware judges, contrary to the 
body of case law they built since the 1980s, allowed shareholders alone 
to take those steps, Delaware would resemble the European system 
under the European Takeover Directive.81 Should a pro-shareholder 
approach be endorsed, shareholders of Delaware companies would be 
able, if such bylaws were actually approved, to opt into a regime similar 
to the board neutrality rule, which imposes managerial passivity unless 
shareholders approve the defenses.82 In other words, the regime 
proposed by pro-shareholder advocates would make Delaware similar to 
                                                                                                                 
price. Those short-term investors are allegedly indifferent to the target’s fundamental or 
long-term value because they only care about their ability to remove the board and 
tender their shares. See, e.g., Airgas, 16 A.3d at 108-10. 
 78. To be sure, to make it a credible commitment directors would also have to set 
up some mechanism to ensure the board could not subsequently reverse this newly-
adopted system. For example, as soon as a bid is perceived as imminent—otherwise, 
the whole purpose of such commitment would be defeated. Such a mechanism could be 
achieved through hardwiring (e.g., by allowing its reversal only with shareholder 
consent) or through an outright prohibition to reverse it (possibly subject to a sunset 
after a certain number of years), as an indeterminate and non-reversible commitment 
might be considered in violation of the DGCL and the ensuing case law on pills based 
on Section 141(a). See DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 141(a); Quickturn Design Sys. v. 
Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1293 (Del. 1998) (holding that a “Delayed Redemption 
Provision” in a so-called “dead-hand” pill is invalid because it “impermissibly 
circumscribes the board’s statutory power under Section 141(a) and the directors’ 
ability to fulfill their concomitant fiduciary duties”). 
 79. But they still can make hostile offers more or less probable through several 
other ways (e.g., by adopting a staggered board). See, infra Part III.B.1.a. 
 80. See Tonello, supra note 43. 
 81. See supra note 6. 
 82. More precisely, the Directive gave EU Member States the option to decide 
whether to impose the board neutrality rule as mandatory. If a Member State does not 
impose the board neutrality rule, companies can revert to the “default” regime and 
adopt the rule on a voluntary basis. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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those European jurisdictions83 that by default do not impose the board 
neutrality rule, but instead make it optional for shareholders to adopt it 
(the Directive requires Member States to leave the door open to such 
opt-in if they do not impose the board neutrality rule).84 However, given 
the public choice-type dynamics behind Delaware rulemaking 
(especially after the Airgas decision, in which such dynamics are more 
than apparent),85 one should not expect to see this happening anytime 
soon. 
Still, with the caveats I describe shortly, from a takeover law 
perspective, the vast majority of Delaware companies facing unsolicited 
bids are ultimately in a situation that does not significantly differ from 
the regime their European peers are subject to with the board neutrality 
rule. The rest of this article explains why and how. 
III. DO THE LAWS ON TAKEOVER DEFENSES MATTER? 
Before taking on the main thesis of this article,86 it is beneficial to 
consider its background. Mainstream literature (from both academic and 
                                                                                                                 
 83. That is the regime of, among others, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Poland. See CTR. EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, THE TAKEOVER BIDS DIRECTIVE 
ASSESSMENT REPORT 190 (2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
company/docs/takeoverbids/study/study_en.pdf [hereinafter CEPS REPORT]. 
 84. See Council Directive 2004/25, art. 12, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 21 (EC). 
 85. In Airgas, then-Chancellor Chandler did not refrain from criticizing Delaware’s 
current pro-target jurisprudence. However, he recognized he had little room to 
maneuver for a ruling favorable to the bidder, as the Delaware Supreme Court would 
have likely overturned any departure from the state-of-the-art in Delaware. Air Prods. 
& Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011). Therefore, as Steven 
Davidoff characterized the decision, then-Chancellor Chandler decided “strategically” 
in favor of the target’s board. Steven M. Davidoff, Air Products v. Airgas and the Value 
of Strategic Judicial Decision-Making 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 502, 505-07 (2012). 
This is very much in line with Professor Roe’s analysis of Delaware politics: its 
judiciary is aware that any pro-bidder decision would put its primacy at risk. Roe, supra 
note 60, at 625-26. Furthermore, this is actually similar to what happened in the 1980s 
in the aftermath of two of the rare decisions in which judges ruled against directors. 
City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988); Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), overruled by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 
(Del. 2009). 
 86. The basic idea I wish to further develop in this Article has been first introduced 
in an earlier work of mine. MATTEO GATTI, OPA E STRUTTURA DEL MERCATO DEL 
CONTROLLO SOCIETARIO [TENDER OFFERS AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE MARKET FOR 
CORPORATE CONTROL] 96-107 (2004) (drawing from intuitions present in Matteo Gatti, 
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practicing lawyers) has traditionally consisted of two types of 
discussion: (i) the positive law debate as to whether under applicable 
law shareholders (as opposed to directors) have power to decide on the 
outcome of the acquisition; and (ii) the policy debate as to whether 
shareholders (as opposed to directors) should have such power. In the 
rest of this article, I show that under both the current Delaware and 
United Kingdom regimes, shareholders do have such power, yet 
sometimes they are in no position to exercise it—and the reason for such 
inability to exercise such power is not embedded in the takeover regime, 
but rather in rules, principles and/or practices that are external to it – 
what I call corporate law collateral factors. My purpose is to show (i) 
who actually has power in a takeover situation; and (ii) what rules, 
principles and/or practices (external to the takeover regime) are at work 
to bestow such power. The policy implications are quite intuitive: 
commentators pushing for more shareholder power in the takeover 
context need not look at and change the takeover regime itself but rather 
                                                                                                                 
Limitations of Acquirers’ Contractual Freedom in the Market for Corporate Control 45-
50 (2002) (unpublished LL.M. Paper, Harvard Law School) (on file with author)); see 
Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, EC Reforms of Corporate Governance and Capital 
Markets Law: Do They Tackle Insiders’ Opportunism?, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS 1, 29 
n.144 (2007). The idea has since been developed by some European scholars. See also 
Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, David Kershaw & Matteo Solinas, Is the Board Neutrality 
Rule Trivial? Amnesia about Corporate Law in European Takeover Regulation, 22 
EUR. BUS. L. REV. 559, 562 (2011). While Gerner-Beuerle, Kershaw, and Solinas’ 
article is a step forward in the development of the idea and its contribution to the 
literature, the focus of that work is centered around Europe and the Member States’ 
implementation of the Takeover Bids Directive in relation to the board neutrality rule: 
one of their main points is that, even absent a board neutrality rule, most European 
companies would not be truly free to implement defenses because of restrictions under 
national company laws, and in such circumstances the takeover regime itself is 
inconsequential. Aside from focusing more on takeovers on this side of the Atlantic, in 
this Article I develop the idea from a different perspective: my starting point is that 
Delaware and the United Kingdom are really not that different, but for the 
aforementioned corporate law collateral factors, and each regime becomes actually 
relevant—as opposed to trivial —precisely because those factors are at work. In other 
words, the very presence of corporate law collateral factors indicates that the takeover 
regime does matter, and that picking one regime over the other can lead to certain 
consequences from a policy standpoint. Essentially, the attainment of whatever policy 
goals a legislature intends to pursue should be netted out of any unintended effects such 
corporate law collateral factors might contribute or, if the legislature is ultimately 
comfortable with such factors playing a role, that decision should expressly be made 
when the takeover rules are set (or interpreted). 
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such external rules, principles and/or practices (and their combination 
with such regime). 
A. JUST A DIFFERENT “DEFAULT” REGIME? 
If Delaware decided to change the allocation of power between 
directors and shareholders in the context of hostile acquisitions, its 
takeover laws would be similar to those of certain European 
jurisdictions. That would be a catastrophic departure from a well-
established body of law according to some,87 while others would 
welcome it as a major improvement.88 I question whether, even without 
such a change, the status quo in Delaware is so drastically different from 
the pro-shareholder regime in the United Kingdom. 
In fact, as some authors have conceded, the Delaware system and a 
regime of board neutrality are similar: under both, shareholders have the 
ability to determine the outcome of an acquisition.89 
In Delaware, a bidder can mount a proxy fight to oust the 
incumbent directors, replace them with new ones who will redeem the 
poison pill and allow the acquisition to go through: if enough 
shareholders are convinced the price the bidder is offering adequately 
values their shares, they will vote in favor of the bidder’s candidates and 
reverse the pro-target Delaware regime.90 
Conversely, in the United Kingdom as well as in several other 
European Union (“EU”) jurisdictions there is a specular, but arguably 
still similar, situation: directors need to get shareholder approval to fend 
off a bid.91 They need to convince shareholders that the offer on the 
                                                                                                                 
 87. See, e.g., Lipton & Rowe, supra note 19, at 3 (noting that adopting this method 
would be a huge departure from precedent); Bainbridge, Preliminary Reflections, supra 
note 77, at 794; Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 51, at 3, 13-14. 
 88. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1784 (2006) (positing that granting shareholders greater power would be 
favorable); Bebchuk, supra note 66. 
 89. Bebchuk & Hart, supra note 8, at 4. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND 
MERGERS, Rule 21, at I14 (11d ed. 2013), available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org. 
uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf (United Kingdom); Article 104, of the so-
called Consolidated Financial Act (Legislative Decree no. 58 of February 24, 1998, 
Supp. Ord. no. 52/L to Gazz. Uff. no. 71 of March 26, 1998, as last amended by 
Legislative Decree no. 104 of July 2, 2010, Supp. Ord. no. 148/L to Gazz. Uff. No . 156 
of July 7, 2010) (It.) (the provision allows opt-out). Note that until 2014, France was 
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table is not in their best interests; if enough shareholders do not like the 
bid, the board will be granted authority to adopt defenses to reject the 
low-ball bid. 
Under both regimes, with a vote in one direction or the other, 
shareholders can have a critical, often times determinant, say on whether 
the tender offer should succeed or not. The real difference between the 
two seemingly opposite regimes rests upon the beneficiary of 
shareholders’ inertia, that is, whom the regime favors if no shareholder 
vote occurs. 
In the Delaware system, the regime is advantageous to target 
directors: in the absence of a proxy fight, the board may maintain the 
pill in place (or adopt it if it does not have one already), thus deterring a 
bidder from an unsolicited acquisition attempt. Instead, the U.K. system 
favors bidders: absent a shareholder vote, a target cannot erect defenses 
and obstruct a bid. 
But even if these two regimes initially favor different sides of the 
takeover battle, the fact that shareholders can vote to reverse the 
applicable regime may ultimately make the debate on how to allocate 
corporate power moot. After all, if the real difference between the two 
systems is who the default rule initially favors, because under both 
regimes shareholders are in the position to decide on the outcome of the 
bid, the overall issue ceases to seem that relevant and one may question 
whether adopting one or the other has any impact.92 
                                                                                                                 
one of the jurisdictions that had adopted the board neutrality rule. See Loi 2006-387 du 
31 mars 2006 relative aux offres publiques d’acquisition [Law 2006-387 of March 31, 
2006 on Public Offers], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Apr. 1, 2006, art. 12. Article 10(V) of Loi 2014-384 
of March 29, 2014 converted the board neutrality rule into an opt-in provision. 
 92. The typical default rules in corporate codes are generally considered somewhat 
sticky. See Luca Enriques, Ronald J. Gilson & Alessio M. Pacces, The Case for an 
Unbiased Takeover Law (with an Application to the European Union) 5 (Stanford Law 
Sch., John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 444, 
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2258926. 
Nevertheless, I am not convinced that in a system of shareholder approval in the face a 
takeover, the stickiness of what I call default is actually relevant in the absence of other 
factors outside of the takeover regime. See supra note 10 for a description of my use of 
the term default. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of what really matters in the 
absence of such other factors. In Delaware, once a bidder decides to pursue a target, it 
will consider all its options to get through the finish line, including, if it has to, going 
hostile, replacing the board and redeeming the pill. After all, the situation is not that 
different to when an acquirer has to take some extra steps in the structuring of a 
transaction in order to win a target. Consider an acquisition, whether hostile or friendly 
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B. HOW REVERSIBLE ARE THE DELAWARE AND THE U.K. REGIMES? JUST 
ASK CORPORATE LAW 
Two apparently different regimes on takeover defenses, the Unocal 
doctrine and its progeny in Delaware and the board neutrality rule in the 
United Kingdom, have a common feature, which is shareholders’ ability 
to have a critical (if not determinant) say on an unsolicited acquisition 
attempt. Despite this similarity, the two regimes differ in the beneficiary 
of the default they set forth (targets in Delaware and bidders in the 
United Kingdom). In Section A, I suggested that one could legitimately 
doubt whether the two regimes are any different, since takeover actors 
can expect shareholders’ preferences to drive the final outcome of the 
acquisition regardless of where the default regime is initially set. One 
could even consider the choice of default regime as not significant. 
The conclusion that the two systems are ultimately similar and not 
significant rests on the basic assumption that each regime is reversible 
without much difficulty or expense. Therefore, for the two default 
regimes to matter in the outcome of an acquisition contest, their degree 
of reversibility is crucial: if the parties interested in reversing the status 
quo find undue burdens and do not have a fair chance to prevail, setting 
the default one way or the other will have a significant impact on the 
final outcome, since the default rule will less likely be reversed.93 
Sometimes, such an assumption cannot be met; that is not a result 
of the takeover regime itself, but rather derives from certain corporate 
law rules, principles and/or practices applicable in the particular 
jurisdiction. In other words, without such rules, principles and/or 
practices, which are external to the takeover regime and labeled here as 
“corporate law collateral factors,” the two regimes could, from an 
                                                                                                                 
is irrelevant, of companies whose financing contracts contain change-in-control 
provisions: it is customary that, in parallel to the acquisition piece of the transaction, the 
acquirer would make an exit consent-type tender offer on the corporate debt as well. In 
other words, in the M&A world acquirers have to go to extra lengths quite often, so the 
fact that a proxy contest might be necessary should not really alter the final outcome if 
the proxy rules and other factors do not make it overly difficult for the acquirer to win 
control of the board. Similar considerations apply to the opposite regime of board 
passivity, where the board can actually play a crucial role, given the control of the 
proxy machinery, to convince shareholders to approve defenses when a low-ball offer is 
on the table. 
 93. Cf. Bebchuk & Hart, supra note 8, at 4 (noting that “[p]oison pills can become 
problematic . . . when combined with arrangements that make it difficult or even 
impossible for a rival to get an effective shareholder vote on its acquisition offer”). 
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aseptic legal perspective, be reversed with very similar odds.94 
Whenever reversibility of the takeover regime is guaranteed, this Article 
argues that the legal regime would determine the outcome of a bid much 
less than other real-world considerations, such as the actual ownership 
structure of the target, the premium offered by the bidder, the intensity 
of the efforts by target and bidder to prevail in the takeover, as well as 
their ability to shape the best takeover strategies from legal, business, 
financial, and public relations perspectives. 
This Section analyzes the reversibility of a default regime from the 
perspective of regimes, like those in Delaware and the United Kingdom, 
on two distinct conceptual levels, by looking at (i) the rules, principles, 
and practices governing shareholder voting, director elections, and board 
composition,95 and (ii) the type of defenses that can ultimately be chosen 
by a target’s board to fend off a tender offer under each regime 
(IV.B.2).96 Sub-section one addresses technical aspects of shareholder 
voting and elections, while sub-section two relates to the spectrum of 
choices for shareholders (and how those choices appeal to them). Each 
is a corporate law collateral factor of a very different nature.97 
1. Board Composition, Directors’ Elections, and Shareholder Voting 
Rules governing board composition, director elections, and 
shareholder voting generally are the most relevant factors affecting the 
reversibility of a takeover regime giving shareholders a say in the 
outcome of an acquisition. I separately analyze staggered boards, 
director removability, shareholders’ ability to call special meetings or 
act by written consent, supermajority provisions, proxy rules in general, 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Such rules, principles, and/or practices happen to produce collateral effects on 
the takeover regime and the potential outcome of an acquisition, even if the primary 
rationale for such a rule, principle, or practice is not to influence the outcome of an 
acquisition. 
 95. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 96. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 97. This Article does not address corporate law factors that do not affect the 
reversibility of the anti-takeover regime; it only addresses those that affect the general 
contestability of control of a given target. The two issues are rather different, and the 
former does not matter for current purposes. This Article deals with corporations that 
are (or can become) subject to a hostile takeover, that is, corporations whose control is 
contestable in the market. Corporations whose control is not contestable in the market 
for whatever reasons, including ownership structure and/or pre-bid defenses, are not the 
focus here. Therefore, the Article does not analyze, among other things, dual-class 
share structures, pyramidal groups, and cross-shareholding. 
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and rules policing shareholders’ conflicts of interest. Preliminarily 
though, some context on the role played by shareholder voting in the 
acquisitions context will set the stage for the analysis. 
Shareholder voting is considered by some scholars an effective way 
to solve the pressure-to-tender problem affecting tender offers: in short, 
the concern that shareholders might decide whether to tender their 
shares not on the basis of the merits of the offer, but rather because they 
want to avoid failing to tender to an offer that is ultimately successful, in 
which case they would get stuck with minority shares that would trade at 
a much lower price.98 By way of voting, shareholders are able to decide 
cohesively, as if they were a “sole owner” who can evaluate all the pros 
and cons of a given proposal.99 The decision reached by shareholders is 
considered the best tool a legal system can provide to obtain a statistical 
approximation of what a sole owner would have done in a two-person, 
buyer and seller negotiation.100 In the absence of a vote, shareholders 
would fail to coordinate and might likely decide to tender because of 
pressure to do so. Since shareholders are able to tender their shares even 
if they voted against the bid, when they vote they can express their 
genuine opinion of the bid based on how they view the offer price 
versus the expected value of the target should it stay independent. To 
put all this in the context of the two systems: in Delaware, shareholders 
who do not want the bid to succeed will vote for the incumbent directors 
who will maintain the pill in place; in the United Kingdom, those same 
shareholders would cast their votes to authorize directors to adopt 
defenses. 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Professor Bebchuk is the most prominent advocate of shareholder voting in 
acquisitions. See Bebchuk, supra note 65; Bebchuk, Pressure to Tender, supra note 71; 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Sole Owner Standard for Takeover Policy, 17 J. LEG. ST. 197 
(1988). 
 99. Lucian A. Bebchuk, A Model of the Outcome of Takeover Bids 16, 22 (Harvard 
Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 11, 1985) (on 
file with author). See also Zohar Goshen, Voting (Insincerely) in Corporate Law, 2 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 815, 835 (2001) (“These restrictions [including shareholder 
voting] allow security holders to arrive at the group preference by forcing people who 
wish to transact with the group to acquire its consent. . . . [T]ransactions are invalid ex 
ante if the rights of the security holders are not protected up front.”). 
 100. See Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: 
Theory Meets Reality, 91 CAL. L. REV. 393, 399-400 (2003); see also Bebchuk, 
Pressure to Tender, supra note 72, at 915-17 (discussing the actions of a sole owner in 
the sale of his or her assets and why the shareholder vote is the best mechanism to 
ensure undistorted choice and efficient allocation of assets in a tender offer). 
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The following subsections a. through f. will analyze instances in 
which shareholder choice cannot genuinely show the group preference 
on a tender offer, namely, when a staggered board is in place, when 
there are obstacles to director removability, when shareholders cannot 
call special meetings or act by written consent, when a supermajority is 
required to pass the relevant resolution, unbalanced proxy rules and 
ineffective policing of shareholders’ conflict of interest. 
While, admittedly, legal commentators have given broad attention 
to staggered boards over the last ten to fifteen years, many other 
significant corporate law collateral factors have largely been 
overlooked. 
a. Staggered Boards 
When combined with a staggered board, a pro-target regime is very 
likely to favor the target company. In Delaware, staggered boards alter 
the outcome of proxy fights contests aimed at ousting the board and 
removing anti-takeover devices, such as the poison pill.101 In order to 
replace the majority of the board and redeem a pill, a bidder would need 
to win two elections within a one-year interval.102 As leading scholars 
have demonstrated, this is quite problematic, as at the first election 
bidders will effectively give target shareholders a put option exercisable 
one year later: if between the two elections the stock has gone down, the 
bidder will have to close an acquisition where it is likely overpaying (the 
stock has gone down at a time when the bidder had only one-third of the 
board and could not run the company); if, however, the target stock has 
gone up, shareholders (meaning, M&A arbitrageurs) would likely not 
vote for the bidder nominees unless the bidder increases the initial offer 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 52, at 890.  Significantly, 
commentators have proposed reforms to further insulate boards within the pro-target 
default regime by requiring intervals between director elections of greater than one 
year. These proposals are primarily driven by short-termism concerns. See Martin 
Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The 
Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 224-31 (1991) (proposing 
intervals of five-years); Jacobs, supra note 77, at 1658 (proposing intervals of five-
years); Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 77, at 1072 (proposing intervals of three-
years); see also Guhan Subramanian, Delaware’s Choice, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 9-12 
(2014) (proposing as an alternative to the current trend of declassifying staggered 
boards, three-year terms for boards of directors of ineffective staggered boards, for 
example a “bylaws-based” staggered board, with the ability for shareholders to “recall” 
the directors if a hostile takeover bid is presented). 
 102. Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 52, at 890. 
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(why change course if the market likes the current board?).103 All in all, 
staggered boards make unsolicited deals less likely. Not surprisingly, 
one empirical study has shown that the stock market responds positively 
to the potential destaggering of the board and negatively when the 
staggered board is maintained.104 
In sum, the proposition that the takeover regime does not matter 
does not hold for Delaware companies that have an effective staggered 
board.105 It is no wonder that the staggered board has been the most 
powerful anti-takeover device for Delaware targets and that it has been 
debated and challenged so extensively over the past ten years.106 
As noted in Part I.C, Airgas now seems to have removed most of 
the uncertainties concerning the validity of the device.107 Does the very 
fact that Delaware companies can use staggered boards (and therefore 
make the reversal of the pro-target regime almost impossible) invalidate 
the Unocal passage stating that shareholders can always use “the powers 
of corporate democracy . . . to turn the board out”108 and remove a 
defense? In other words, is the pro-management approach in Delaware 
de facto irreversible and therefore not a default? 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id. at 923. 
 104. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Staggered Boards and the Wealth of 
Shareholders: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments (Harvard Law Sch., John M. 
Olin Ctr. Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 697, 2011), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Bebchuk_et%20al_697.p
df. But see Coffee & Palia, supra note 22, at 78-79 (citing studies that “support[] the 
view that staggered boards can provide stability and continuity that enhances 
shareholder value”). 
 105. By designating a staggered board “effective,” it means that the board’s 
staggered nature is hard-wired in the certificate of incorporation (and not in the bylaws) 
and cannot be declassified or “packed” (that is, increased in size to fill vacancies) by 
shareholders without approval from the board itself (all changes to the certificate of 
incorporation require approval by both the board and the shareholder) —given that the 
board is composed of incumbents, the chances of a hostile bidder declassifying an 
effective staggered board are minimal. Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 52, 
at 894; see DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 242(b)(1)-(2) (2014). But see Subramanian, supra 
note 101, at 5-6 (proposing the conversion of effective staggered boards into ineffective 
staggered boards so that boards will have long-term continuity and shareholders will 
have the opportunity to decide on a hostile takeover bid in a “single, up-or-down 
referendum”) for a discussion of an alternative to declassifying effective staggered 
boards. 
 106. See supra note 101. 
 107. See supra note 54. 
 108. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985). 
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Yes, in part. And no, in part. 
In theory, after Airgas, Delaware targets can all be considered 
potentially takeover-proof, should they all avail themselves of a 
staggered board structure. For companies at the initial public offering 
(“IPO”) stage, this is clearly an option that issuer counsel should, and 
normally does, raise for management’s consideration.109 
However, things work quite differently for existing companies. 
Indeed, Delaware companies that have a staggered board in place 
amount to 45.8% in number and only 15.5% in terms of market 
capitalization.110 Furthermore, legal commentators have observed a trend 
of destaggering in the marketplace over the past decade.111 Chances that 
existing companies adopt one are slim since implementing an effective 
staggered board, which can only be dismantled by a vote by both 
directors and shareholders, requires shareholder approval.112 The very 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the 
Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1303-05 (2001). 
 110. See Table I, infra Part III.C. 
 111. See Tonello, supra note 43, at 10 n.10 and accompanying text; see also 
Subramanian, supra note 101, at 2, 9. 
 112. Adopting a staggered board can be unappealing to shareholders, so directors 
often do not even attempt to adopt it, as institutional investors would reject it. See 
Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 52, at 892. This however does not mean 
that existing corporations are never able to adopt one. Since 2007, twenty-one 
corporations have adopted a staggered board: CKRush, Inc., XPO Logistics, Inc., 
MeetMe, Inc., General Moly, Inc., VirnetX Holding Corp., Synutra International, Inc., 
BioDelivery Sciences International, Inc., Oculus Innovative Sciences, Inc., SunPower 
Corp., ReGen Biologics, Inc., Radient Pharmaceuticals Corp., INTL FCStone, Inc., 
NeoStem Inc., Earthstone Energy, Inc., Spectrum Brands, Inc., Isle of Capri Casinos, 
Inc., Bacterin International Holdings, Inc., Boulder Brands Inc., China Biologic 
Products, Inc., Nexstar Broadcasting Group, Inc., and Insys Therapeutics, Inc. See Fact 
Set, SHARKREPELLENT.NET (on file with author). The following table shows the yearly 
breakdown of how many corporations adopted a staggered board and how many 
corporations declassified their boards from 2007 through June 2013: 
Year Adoption of Classified Boards Declassified Boards 
2007 5 26 
2008 4 32 
2009 5 28 
2010 1 40 
2011 3 39 
2012 1 46 
2013  
(through June 4) 2 33 
Total 21 244 
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reason that poison pills were invented and became attractive was to 
avoid a shareholder vote to adopt the defense.113 
Ultimately, whether a staggered board is in place and de facto 
allows a target to resist an unsolicited offer for at least thirteen months is 
much more important than who has the burden to reverse the default 
regime. The staggered board acts independently of the actual takeover 
law, which bans defenses only if they make a proxy contest realistically 
unattainable.114 
Notably, in jurisdictions adopting the board neutrality rule, the 
presence of a staggered board does not have an impact on the 
reversibility of the default itself, given that shareholders, instead of 
casting their vote in an election contest, express their preference in favor 
of or against defensive measures, which in turn represents their say on 
the acquisition. Nonetheless, in such jurisdictions a staggered board 
could still impact a takeover contest by discouraging a prospective 
bidder from making an unsolicited offer for a company it will not be 
able to fully control following completion of the tender offer (assuming, 
of course, that directors cannot be removed in the absence of cause in 
such circumstances).115 
b. Director Removability 
The inability to remove directors other than for cause can deter 
hostile bidders under both regimes: in Delaware and in other pro-target 
jurisdictions, replacing the board to redeem the pill (or the relevant 
defense) would not be possible, and in a board neutrality regime, a 
winning bidder would have to negotiate with the current directors for 
                                                                                                                 
But see Advancing Annual Elections in the 2014 Proxy Season: Towards 
Declassification at 100 S&P 500 and Fortune 500 Companies, Shareholder Rights 
Project News Alert (Harvard Law Sch., Cambridge, Mass.), Dec. 4, 2013, at 1, 
available at http://srp.law.harvard.edu/newsletters/12-4-2013_SRP_newsletter.shtml 
(announcing that thirty-one shareholder proposals regarding board declassification were 
submitted to Fortune 500 and S&P 500 companies for a vote at their 2014 annual 
meetings and that seven companies have already agreed to declassify). See also Coffee 
& Palia, supra note 22, at 14 (noting that “[i]n 2000, 300 of the S&P 500 had staggered 
boards, but as of the end of 2013, only 60 did”). 
 113. See supra note 25, at 876-77. 
 114. Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 601 (Del. 2010); Air Prods. 
& Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 113 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
 115. See CEPS REPORT, supra note 83, at 307 (“[S]taggered boards are not a feature 
of European company law.”). 
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their resignation or renewal.116 Once again, irrespective of the takeover 
regime, a corporate law collateral factor can play a crucial role in the 
outcome of a hostile tender offer (and therefore, from an ex ante 
perspective, in the likelihood that such an offer will ever be presented). 
c. Shareholders’ Ability to Call Special Meetings or Act by Written 
Consent 
In Delaware, a shareholder vote on an acquisition might not occur 
until the first annual meeting of the target following the bid.117 This is 
the case for companies whose organizational documents neither 
empower shareholders to call special meetings118 nor allow them to act 
by written consent.119 In such circumstances, unless the acquisition is 
planned and launched sufficiently prior to the annual meeting of the 
target, a bidder will not be in a position to oust the incumbent board and 
have the pill redeemed. In other words, when bidders cannot call a 
special meeting or solicit stockholder consents, the Delaware regime 
implicitly gives a target’s board an advantage —such an advantage runs 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Jurisdictions adopting the board neutrality rule, such as the United Kingdom, 
and Italy, make it relatively easy to remove directors without cause (when removed 
without cause, directors typically get some form of monetary compensation but cannot 
get judicially reinstated). See Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, 
The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders as a Class, in REINIER 
R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 55, 61 (2d ed. 2009); Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in 
Corporate Law Between the United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of 
Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 750 (2005) (“[I]n most Continental European 
countries, a shareholder or group of shareholders can convene a meeting and then 
dismiss all directors by a mere majority vote.”) (footnote omitted) (emphasis omitted). 
But see id. at 739 (noting that removal is constrained in other countries in continental 
Europe such as Germany and Austria). 
 117. Cf. Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. 
REV. 129, 139 (2009) (noting that efforts by someone seeking control “to speed up the 
timetable are hindered by legal limits on non-managers’ ability to call a special meeting 
of shareholders or to act by written consent”). 
 118. In Delaware, stockholders can call special meetings only if the certificate of 
incorporation so provides. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 211(d) (2014) (“Special meetings 
of the stockholders may be called by the board of directors or by such person or persons 
as may be authorized by the certificate of incorporation or by the bylaws.”). 
 119. In Delaware, stockholder action may be taken by written consent in lieu of a 
meeting unless prohibited by the certificate of incorporation (either expressly or 
implicitly by requiring unanimous consent). Id. at § 228(a). 
116 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XX 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
for a significant portion of each fiscal year and obviously vanishes the 
closer the company gets to the next annual meeting. 
This is a problem peculiar to the Delaware regime as well as other 
jurisdictions adopting similar pro-target approaches, since in the United 
Kingdom system, as well as in any other regime adopting the board 
neutrality rule under the Directive, it will be the directors who actually 
call the meeting to obtain shareholder approval on the envisaged 
defenses.120 
At first glance, shareholders’ inability to call special meetings or 
act by written consent may seem to be of limited impact: after all, a 
prospective bidder would just have to adequately plan and launch the 
bid at the right time, that is, in advance of the proxy season for an 
annual meeting. In other words, such corporations are in play only for 
certain periods of time during each fiscal year. 
While this usually holds true in Delaware, in some circumstances 
the absence of special meetings and actions by written consent might 
have a deeper impact. Consider the following scenario: right after the 
time period for the annual meeting is over, a company announces a 
business combination with another company, which would neither 
trigger Revlon duties121 (and would therefore be subject to the more 
lenient Unocal and Unitrin standards),122 nor require a vote on the 
combination by the company’s shareholders (think of a stock-for-stock 
exchange offer, as a result of which there is no change of control for 
Revlon purposes). In this hypothetical, not only would shareholders not 
be able to turn down the deal on a referendum basis, but also a potential 
competing bidder might never prevail in an auction, especially in the 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Under the Directive, “Member States may adopt rules allowing a general 
meeting of shareholders to be called at short notice, provided that the meeting does not 
take place within two weeks of notification’s being given.” Council Directive 2004/25, 
art. 9, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 19 (EC). 
 121. Thus, the deal consideration must not be cash and the deal must be a 
combination “of equals” and not result in a change of control of the target company. 
Under Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46-48 (Del. 
1994), this would occur when the target company gets acquired by a company of a 
relatively similar size that does not have a controlling stockholder who would otherwise 
end up controlling the combined company: if the control of the target combined with 
the other entity would continue to stay fluid in the market, stockholders of the target 
would not face a loss in their voting rights and therefore Revlon would not apply. See 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 122. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text for a summary of the Unocal and 
Unitrin standards. 
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likely event that the target company insists on keeping its poison pill in 
place and the next annual meeting when the competing bidder can 
replace the board and get rid of the pill is too far away. In such a 
scenario, and in all other instances where a hostile bidder cannot quickly 
replace the board before it takes defensive actions that ultimately 
frustrate the attempted acquisition, the inability to call a special meeting 
and act by consent actually plays a crucial role and alters the outcome of 
what could have been a lively contest for the control of the company. 
Consider that the Delaware regime stemming from the rulings in 
Unocal, Unitrin, Versata, and Airgas123 allows directors to take certain 
defensive actions so long as such actions do not make a proxy fight 
realistically unattainable.124 An analysis of a FactSet SharkRepellent 
database listing the universe of attempted hostile deals with a Delaware 
target from 2003 to June 2013125 shows that at least in a couple of 
circumstances a bidder walked away from the acquisition without 
attempting a proxy fight after the target enacted defenses that chilled the 
bidder’s interest.126 While one could object to my main thesis that such 
deals – where targets successfully rebuff the bidder without having to 
resist any proxy fight – show how the Delaware regime does in fact 
                                                                                                                 
 123. See supra notes 29-35. 
 124. See Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 601 (Del. 2010); Air 
Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 113 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
 125. Fact Set, SHARKREPELLENT.NET (June 7, 2013) (on file with author). 
 126. In the attempted acquisition of Exact Sciences, Corp. by Sequenom, Inc., 
valued at approximately $40 million, Sequenom abandoned the acquisition without a 
proxy fight after the target sold its assets to Genzyme for $24.5 million. Unexpectedly, 
based on the information that is publicly available, the latter’s defensive transaction did 
not require a stockholders vote under Section 271 of the DGCL, and one of the 
conditions to closing was actually the receipt of legal opinion by Delaware counsel to 
that effect. See DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 271 (2014); COLLABORATION, LICENSE AND 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN GENZYME CORPORATION AND EXACT SCIENCES 
CORPORATION 27-28 (2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/1124140/000110465909004443/a09-3865_1ex10d1.htm (Section 9.6). Further, 
nothing in the deal documentation suggests that the target was under Revlon. See Ryan 
McBride, Exact Sciences Takes $24.5M Genzyme Deal, Sequenom to Drop Buyout 
Offer, XCONOMY.COM (Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.xconomy.com/boston/2009/01/28/ 
exact-sciences-takes-245m-genzyme-deal-sequenom-to-drop-buyout-offer/. 
  In line with the pattern of abandoning an attempted transaction without a proxy 
fight, Stern Agee abandoned its attempted to acquire SWS Group after the target 
effected a defensive recapitalization that ultimately obtained stockholder approval. See 
SWS Group, Inc., Annual Report 34 (Form 10-K) (Sept. 7, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/878520/000119312512383471/d371938d10k.h
tm. 
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favor targets significantly, I argue that they do not weaken my 
arguments. For starters, the SWS Group deal did entail a stockholder 
vote that approved the defensive recapitalization and de facto voted 
against the offer on the table.127 A bidder confident to win would have 
had time to mount a proxy fight to replace the directors and reject the 
defensive recapitalization. The fact that it did not start a proxy fight 
probably resulted from the ownership structure of the target: if the target 
was able to accumulate the votes to approve the recapitalization, the 
composition of its stockholder base must have dissuaded the bidder from 
launching the proxy contest in the first place. In other words, Unocal 
(and its progeny) alone played no role. With respect to the attempted 
acquisition of Exact Sciences, leaving aside that it is not quite clear why 
neither Revlon nor a Section 271 vote were triggered, my thesis is 
confirmed because corporate law collateral factors were actually at 
work. The bidder was in no position to remove the target’s directors 
either by calling a special meeting or soliciting written consents.128 Even 
the hotly contested and ultimately failed attempt to acquire Allergan by 
Valeant and Pershing Square of 2014 fits with the analysis I present in 
this Article.129 Indeed, the bidder(s) had managed to call a special 
meeting to replace the board and redeem Allergan’s pill: nobody knows 
how, without the counter offer by Actavis, things would have played out 
in such a meeting. True, the pill helped Allergan in delaying the 
Valeant/Pershing Square takeover. However, launching the offer so 
much earlier than the meeting ultimately gave Allergan enough time to 
organize and find an alternative, value maximizing transaction with 
                                                                                                                 
 127. See supra note 126. 
 128. See Exact Corp., Sixth Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of 
Exact Corporation 3 (1995), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/1124140/000091205700046284/a2027577zex-3_3.txt; Exact Corp., Amended and 
Restated By-Laws of Exact Corporation 5-7, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/1124140/000091205700046284/a2027577zex-3_4.txt. 
 129. As I write, the Allergan saga has just entered an entirely new (and possibly 
final) chapter with the announcement of the $66 billion white knight transaction with 
Actavis on November 16, 2014, which first bidder Pershing Square, with expected 
paper gains of $2.3 billion, has supported, therefore putting an end to its acrimonious 
contest with the target. See Ackman supports Allergan’s $66 billion sale to Actavis, 
REUTERS, Nov. 18, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/18/us-
allergan-m-a-ackman-idUSKCN0J21X920141118.  For an earlier and critical account 
of the Allergan attempted hostile takeover, see Coffee & Palia, supra note 22, at 41-45. 
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Actavis.130 In other words, it was the corporate law collateral factor (that 
is, the inability to promptly call a shareholder meeting) and not Unocal 
alone that thwarted the takeover.131 
Finally, the inability for shareholders to call special meetings (or 
some material constraints to a call, such as requiring the meeting be 
called by shareholders owning a significant stake)132 or act by written 
consent might be a much more relevant barrier in pro-target jurisdictions 
where, unlike Delaware, directors are not up for re-election every year: 
in such circumstances, their removability (and the elimination of 
takeover defenses) is significantly limited. In other words, the inability 
to call special meetings ceases to be a corporate law collateral factor of a 
mild nature when coupled with a regime that contemplates director 
terms longer than one year. 
d. Supermajority Rules 
Both the Delaware and the United Kingdom systems contemplate 
shareholder voting as a way to establish whether a hostile acquisition 
attempt should go through. In general, when a group of individuals 
coalesces through a voting mechanism, the underlying assumption is 
that “the majority opinion expresses the ‘group preference’, i.e., the 
optimal choice for the group as a whole.”133 As Zohar Goshen states, 
“when a large number of voters attempt to ‘guess’ at the best choice, the 
‘guess’ of the largest group will, statistically speaking, be the ‘correct’ 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Note incidentally that, given the combination with Actavis by way of a merger, 
Allergan’s shareholders will get to vote on the acquisition (only this time under Section 
251 of the DGCL). 
 131. One could also speculate (without obviously ever being able to prove it) that, 
without the time Allergan bought with the pill and its cumbersome rules for calling a 
special meeting, a transaction with such a high premium like the one with Actavis 
would have been more difficult to secure: it is ironic that possibly because of the pill 
Pershing Square is now able to walk netting a staggering $2.3 billion paper gain as a 
consolation prize. 
 132. On both sides of the Atlantic, the statutory right to convene special meetings is 
generally subject to certain fine-tuning of the organizational documents, and it is 
seldom an all-or-nothing issue. Jurisdictions generally require that shareholders must 
represent a minimum threshold of shareholder capital to request a special meeting. See 
Cools, supra note 116, at 731-33 (discussing Delaware, Belgium, and France). 
 133. Goshen, supra note 100, at 399. 
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one.”134 Indeed, “[t]here is no reason to suppose a priori that the 
minority’s rejection of a proposed transaction is preferable when the 
majority of the group’s members believe the transaction to be 
worthwhile.”135   
On the contrary, supermajority provisions (e.g., requiring a two-
thirds vote) do favor minorities over majorities in all instances in which 
a minority coalition is able to block a resolution that a simple majority 
would otherwise approve (i.e., 66.6% > majority vote obtained at the 
actual meeting > 50%).136 
In the takeover world, this means that when a supermajority is 
necessary to pass a resolution to reverse the regime, those whose 
interests are protected by the regime have a significant advantage over 
those who seek to reverse it. 
Some jurisdictions imposing the board neutrality rule do require 
that certain defensive actions be approved by a supermajority. For 
instance, to pass certain defenses Italian companies need an approval of 
two-thirds of the shares present at the meeting (meaning it will be 
enough for a bidder to form a one-third plus one share vetoing minority 
to block the defense).137 A study commissioned by the European 
Commission sampled 464 listed companies among sixteen Member 
States and found that “[a]ll companies in the sample are subject to 
supermajority provisions for some resolutions at extraordinary general 
meetings, based on national regulation.”138 Furthermore, European 
companies are generally free to raise, by private ordering, the required 
                                                                                                                 
 134. Zohar Goshen, Voting and the Economics of Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory 
Meets Reality 7, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=229273 
 135. Id. at 8 (noting that “it is also in the minority’s interest, ex ante, that the 
majority view prevails”). 
 136. For example, in early 2009, after Biotechnology Value Fund attempted a tender 
offer and launched a proxy fight to acquire Avigen. The bidder called a special meeting 
to replace existing directors with a four-person slate. Although the bidder/insurgent 
obtained 58% of the vote, the acquisition fell through because a supermajority of 
66.67% was necessary to remove directors. See Biotech Firm to Liquidate Under 
Investor’s Pressure, DEALBOOK (Mar. 30, 2009, 6:02 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes. 
com/2009/03/30/biotech-firm-to-liquidate-under-investors-pressure/?_r=0. 
 137. See Codice civile, art. 2368-69 (It.). 
 138. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 23 (2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/ 
docs/shareholders/study/final_report_en.pdf. 
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majorities to pass certain actions.139 By doing so they can make it much 
harder to pass such actions during takeover attempts. Arguably, this is 
less of a risk for companies subject to the board neutrality rule than for 
companies that are not, given that incumbents in board neutrality rule 
companies can anticipate that a supermajority requirement would hinder 
any defense against a hostile takeover offer). 
In the board neutrality regime, when a supermajority is necessary to 
pass a resolution, those whom the default favors (that is, bidders) are 
advantaged: to win the vote, they will simply need to accumulate a 
block sufficient to ensure the defensive measure will not be approved by 
the required supermajority. Note that none of these supermajority rules 
are typically part of the actual takeover regulation; they are general 
requirements under applicable corporate laws for the approval of 
resolutions that entail an amendment of the articles of association — 
regardless of whether their purpose is defensive. In sum, combined with 
a board neutrality regime, supermajority requirements represent a 
corporate law collateral factor that can alter the reversibility of the 
takeover regime and favor bidders. 
Similarly, in the opposite scenario, any supermajority requirement 
for the election and/or removal of directors of a Delaware company 
makes it more difficult for a bidder to replace the board and redeem the 
pill. From a practical standpoint, the election of directors is not a 
problem prospective bidders face, because there are no Delaware 
companies of which I am aware that require a supermajority to elect 
directors.140 However, there are several companies that require 
supermajorities to remove directors, whether or not for cause.141 
Because reversing the default is harder when a supermajority vote 
is necessary to pass the relevant resolution, a jurisdiction’s default 
favors one side of the takeover battle. This is especially true in 
circumstances where those who oppose the default regime are only able 
to accumulate a simple majority. 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Id. at 21 (“All countries, except France and Ireland (where the situation is 
unclear) allow companies to introduce supermajority provisions in their by-laws[.]”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 140. The reasoning is intuitive: having to obtain a supermajority to pass resolutions 
on a regular basis, such as those to elect directors, would be very disruptive for a 
company. As an example, companies with low turnouts at annual meetings would 
struggle to get the required votes to appoint directors. 
 141. In particular, there are 642 Delaware companies (27.4% of all Delaware public 
corporations, and 14.7% in terms of market capitalization) that require a supermajority 
vote to remove directors. See infra Part III.C. 
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e. Rules on Proxy Contests 
In the presence of barriers to proxy contests, it will be more 
difficult for shareholders to reverse the regime. If a proxy regime is 
incumbent-friendly, for instance, by requiring a shareholder to hold a 
minimum percentage of shares over a period of time before mounting a 
proxy contest,142 it will be more difficult to change the status quo, and 
the default regime on takeover defenses will have a significant impact 
on the outcome of the contest.143 While one would expect that proxy 
rules would naturally strive to set a neutral balance between incumbents 
and insurgents, in the world of hostile acquisitions biased proxy rules 
end up favoring one side of the control contest. Depending on where the 
takeover default regime lies, such rules can impact the ultimate outcome 
of the acquisition: in jurisdictions following the Delaware approach, 
                                                                                                                 
 142. This might disqualify certain bidders from soliciting proxies. 
 143. I do not believe that pro-incumbent rules on the reimbursement of proxy 
expenses necessarily fit into this category and represent a single factor that can 
discourage or prevent a proxy fight in the broader context of a hostile deal. For 
instance, the Froessell Rule—followed in both New York and Delaware—allows 
incumbents to be reimbursed for proxy contest expenses regardless of the outcome 
when (i) the proxy contest involves questions of policy (as opposed to purely personal 
reasons), (ii) the expenses are reasonable and necessary for informing the corporation’s 
shareholders of the board’s policy stance, and (iii) the challengers’ potential for 
reimbursement is significantly limited. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & 
Airplane Co., 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. 1955) (N.Y.); Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight 
Picture Screen Corp., 171 A. 226, 227 (Del. Ch. 1934) (Del.); see also CA, Inc., v. 
AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 237-39 (Del. 2008) (declaring as 
violative of Delaware law a shareholder-proposed bylaw that would reimburse 
challengers in a proxy contest); Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 11, at 1106-08. But see 
DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 113 (2014) (allowing corporations to adopt bylaws that 
provide reimbursement to challengers in a proxy contest). I do not believe 
reimbursement rules are that significant in the context of acquisitions, especially if the 
target is of a non-trivial monetary size, since the cost of the proxy fight would represent 
one of many other costs that a bidder would likely be prepared to incur. See supra note 
92. By way of illustration, the most expensive proxy fights from 2008 to 2012 cost 
anywhere from $9 million to $22 million with incumbent boards spending significantly 
more than challenger dissidents. During that same time, proxy solicitor fees ranged 
from $1 million to $2.5 million, again with incumbents significantly outspending 
challengers. See Adam Kommel, Proxy Fight Fees and Costs Now Collected by 
SharkRepellent: Mackenzie Partners and Carl Icahn Involved in Largest Fights, 
SHARKREPELLENT.NET (Feb. 20, 2013), https://www.sharkrepellent.net/request?an=dt. 
getPage&st=undefined&pg=/pub/rs_20130220.html&Proxy_fight_fees_and_costs_now
_collected_by_SharkRepellent&rnd=169632. 
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bidders will find it more difficult to appoint new directors and get rid of 
anti-takeover devices; conversely, in jurisdictions following the U.K. 
system, those who oppose the bid and seek to authorize defenses will 
struggle to get such measures approved at a shareholders meeting.144 
f. Shareholders’ Conflict of Interest 
Rules governing conflict of interest by shareholders also play an 
important role. In theory, in order to have two regimes that are perfectly 
indifferent to shareholders, each shareholder resolution that reverses the 
default regime set by the legislature should not be affected by the 
conflict of interest of one or more shareholders. In the absence of a 
“sincere”145 vote, where the outcome of the vote can easily be altered by 
                                                                                                                 
 144. One could also hypothesize that if proxy rules are so significantly biased 
toward either side, the anti-takeover regime ultimately might not matter. In other words, 
all else being neutral (with no supermajority requirements, staggered board, or other 
corporate law collateral factors playing a role) and depending on the actual ownership 
structure of the target corporation in question, if proxy rules are significantly biased in 
favor of incumbents or insurgents, they can be much more relevant than the actual anti-
takeover default regime in determining the outcome of the acquisition. Consequently, if 
both the anti-takeover regime and the proxy rules favor targets and incumbents, it will 
be very difficult for bidders to reverse the regime. Note that the ultimate outcome of the 
control contest should not change if the anti-takeover default regime is pro-shareholder 
and the proxy regime is unbalanced and biased for incumbents because an unbalanced, 
pro-incumbent proxy regime would probably help shareholders that hold a control 
block approve a defense to the bid. In contrast, in the unlikely case of a pro-target, anti-
takeover default regime where the proxy rules significantly favor insurgents, bidders 
would have an easy time reversing the default. This might be considered as potentially 
detrimental as entrenchment because it could lead to too many acquisitions where 
bidders could exploit investors by paying insufficient premiums. Obviously, if the anti-
takeover default regime were pro-shareholder, a pro-insurgent proxy regime would 
exacerbate such a risk. 
 145. See Goshen, supra note 99, at 815-16.  The importance of sincere voting is 
intuitive, and is echoed in some case law (but not case law dealing specifically with 
hostile deals). For example, consider the emphasis on the need for “majority of the 
minority” voting and its effectiveness that the Delaware Chancery Court expressed in In 
re Pure Resources, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002) 
(involving an attempt by a controlling shareholder to make a tender offer to purchase 
remaining shares of a corporation through an approval process that included a majority 
of the minority provision that did not perfectly remove all affiliated shareholders—
including the board members—from such consideration).  Without an effective majority 
of the minority provision, a shareholder vote alone is considered useless. Obviously, 
this is more so the case for entire fairness type of deals given the presence of a 
controlling stockholder; yet things are not conceptually that different in a hostile deal 
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a conflicted vote, setting the default rule in one direction or the other can 
impact the outcome of the acquisition. 
For example, let us assume that: (i) target company X is 
incorporated in a jurisdiction embracing a pro-target rule comparable to 
Delaware’s and is subject to an unsolicited tender offer; (ii) both 
management and bidder own 14.9% of the stock of company X; (iii) 
shareholders are called to vote to oust the board so that the pill can be 
redeemed; (iv) the tender offer has a sizable premium and is thus 
favored by a majority of disinterested investors; and (v) the given 
jurisdiction is capable of policing conflicted voting, say, there is a 
majority of the minority rule in place and therefore shares held by the 
incumbents (14.9% of the stock) and insurgents (14.9% of the stock) 
will not be counted (or general principles on conflicted voting can 
otherwise ensure that same result). Under these circumstances, given 
(iv), target shareholders would be able to replace the board allowing the 
acquisition to go through. 
The outcome would not change if target company X were 
incorporated in a jurisdiction embracing the board neutrality rule. 
Assuming shareholders voted to approve some takeover defenses 
proposed by the board, given again (iv), the same target shareholders 
who were in favor to replace the board and have the pill redeemed under 
the first example would vote against the board proposal to erect defenses 
and the acquisition would still go through. 
However, the outcome would change (and play out differently in 
the two jurisdictions depending on the default regime), if the given 
jurisdiction were not effective in policing conflicted voting. For 
example, a given jurisdiction might prevent the insurgents but not the 
                                                                                                                 
scenario with both management and bidder likely having accumulated significant stakes 
in the corporation. Surprisingly, it appears that the Delaware judiciary has been silent 
on conflicts of interests in connection with proxy fights to replace a board and redeem 
the pill. See Leonard Chazen, Did the Dell Minority-of-the-Majority Clause Go Too 
Far?, LAW360 (July 22, 2013, 2:29 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/459110 
(warning on risks of non-consummation when majority-of-the-minority clauses are 
drafted in an over-inclusive manner: “[t]he type of majority-of-minority clause used in 
the Dell agreement, which requires approval by a majority of the outstanding 
unaffiliated shares, instead of a majority of those voting on the transaction, makes the 
failure to cast a vote the equivalent of a vote against the deal.”); Sharon Terlep, Dell 
Buyout Group Calls for Change in Voting Rules, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323610704578625550322614778.htm
l. 
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incumbents from voting on the actual resolution—or vice versa. 
Assuming that, under the given rules on conflict of interest, insurgents 
cannot vote but incumbents can, under the Delaware regime, this means 
that incumbents will have a better chance at resisting the hostile attempt 
to replace them in the proxy fight; similarly, in a system adopting the 
board neutrality rule, directors will find it easier to have enough votes to 
pass the resolution authorizing the defenses. Under both systems, 
incumbent-friendly rules on shareholder conflict of interest might well 
alter the outcome of the acquisition. Conversely, if the given rules allow 
insurgents but not incumbents to vote, the acquisition would have a 
higher chance to go through under both the Delaware and the United 
Kingdom regimes, and therefore the outcome would be no different than 
if effective rules existed. Note, however, that in the above fact pattern 
shareholders wanted the acquisition to succeed: in the opposite case of a 
low-ball offer that shareholders do not think beneficial, insurgent-
friendly conflict of interest rules would tilt the balance in the insurgents’ 
favor toward a replacement of the incumbent board (in Delaware) or a 
rejection of the defenses proposed by the board (in the United Kingdom) 
that would be at odds with shareholder preferences. Once again, rules 
external to the takeover regime itself would be determinative of the 
outcome of the acquisition. 
2. Structural vs. Transactional Defenses and the Two Default Regimes 
Different default regimes may lead to different outcomes in terms 
of the actual defensive measures that emerge in a given market. Some 
believe that the Delaware system offers more fertile ground for so-called 
structural defenses.146 A structural defense, like the poison pill, consists 
of a “legal mechanism . . . often adopted in advance of a bid, designed to 
deter or impede bids without having a financial or operational effect on 
the target.”147 
The pill is a mere deterrent that does not trigger substantial costs 
for the target – it only signals a “no” to a potential bidder, unless the 
board decides to redeem it or the board itself is replaced by the bidder 
through a proxy contest. Other defensive tactics can be less popular 
among shareholders, because they commit target companies to certain 
risks, including taking on more debt or making a significant acquisition, 
which can have negative consequences on the stock price. 
                                                                                                                 
 146. Kahan & Rock, supra note 25, at 909. 
 147. Coates, supra note 109, at 1306 n.17 (emphasis added). 
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It is common wisdom that European companies cannot adopt 
poison pills, and indeed they do not adopt them.148 Authors suggest that 
one of the main features that make a poison pill a viable defensive 
measure is that the pill does not require a shareholder resolution, which 
would delay a prompt and effective adoption of the defensive device.149 
Furthermore, the possibility that a widely held company’s shareholders 
would approve the adoption of a poison pill is considered remote.150 
A pro-shareholder default would seem to limit structural defenses151 
and de facto imply that companies would have to rely on transactional 
defenses only, which consist of a smaller and less effective arsenal, 
since they require taking operational actions that might end up costing 
money to the company, with a negative effect on the share price. In such 
cases, shareholders might perceive the bid as the lesser of two evils.152 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Guido Ferrarini, Corporate Ownership and Control: Law Reform and the 
Contestability of Corporate Control at the Conference on Company Law Reform in 
OECD Countries 14 (Dec. 7, 2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ 
ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/1931676.pdf (“Poison pills are not used and would 
probably violate either corporate law principles or stock exchange regulations and 
companies’ best practices.”) (footnote omitted); Gordon, supra note 24, at 549-50. See 
also CEPS REPORT, supra note 83, at 307 (citing the findings, limited to the United 
Kingdom, Germany, and Italy by Gerner-Beurle, Kershaw & Solinas, supra note 86). 
 149. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 25, at 909. 
 150. Coates, supra note 109, at 1306-07 (“[S]hareholder approval . . . has not 
generally been forthcoming for defenses since institutional shareholders organized in 
the late 1980s. . . . [E]ven when a bid is not on the table, shareholders have been 
unwilling to approve defenses.”); Gordon, supra note 24, at 551 n.23. See also Lucian 
A. Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 713, 
715 n.4, 723-24 (2003) (concerning shareholder approval of other defensive 
arrangements). 
 151. In the context of a proxy fight in connection with an attempted takeover of a 
Delaware company, when deciding to cast their vote for the insurgents or the 
incumbents, shareholders are essentially voting for or against the bid itself (they 
compare the bid price with the expected value of the target should it remain 
independent). They have a simple binary choice: voting to replace the current board 
means they want the bid to succeed; voting to maintain the current board expresses their 
preference to keep the pill in place and maintain the target’s independence. 
 152. For instance, assume that there is a $48 per share unsolicited bid on the table 
(with, say, a 20% premium over a pre-bid market price of $40), but the market attaches 
an expected price target of $60 per share if the target stays independent.  In such a 
scenario, shareholders of a Delaware company would likely vote for the incumbents’ 
slate to maintain the pill in place and the company’s independence. In a jurisdiction that 
does not contemplate structural defenses, the company would have to adopt 
transactional defenses. If the market perception of such defenses is negative (assuming 
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However, the unavailability of structural defenses under a pro-
shareholder regime should not be a reason to endorse a pro-target policy 
approach. The absence of poison pills and of similar mechanisms in 
jurisdictions adopting a pro-shareholder approach has nothing to do with 
the anti-takeover default regime itself. Rather, it is the inflexibility of its 
corporate law rules and principles that does not allow adopting structural 
or similar defenses: that is, giving shareholders the ability to decide 
between the bid and the hypothetical value of the independent target. In 
theory, if a jurisdiction’s corporate law permitted resolutions that, if 
approved, would ban a bidder from completing the transaction without 
the need for the target to take any further action, even the board 
neutrality rule would permit shareholders to decide whether or not they 
want the bid to succeed.153 
So it is not the takeover regime’s effect on who is to adopt anti-
takeover defenses that is the crucial point, but rather what defenses are 
available. The issue of the spectrum of available defenses to say “no” 
effectively (that is, without disrupting the operations of the company) 
has greater relevance than the much-debated issue of what is the best-
suited corporate body to have a final say on takeover defenses.154 It is 
                                                                                                                 
that their adoption is expected to drag the value down to below $40), shareholders 
would likely reject them, thus allowing the bid to succeed—note that they would let the 
bid go through even if the value of the target as an independent company would have 
been much greater ($60 as opposed to $48 per share). The absence of structural 
defenses may lead to inefficient outcomes whenever incumbents fail to convince 
shareholders that after the adoption of the defense the target will be worth more than 
what the bidder is offering. See Gatti, supra note 86, at 106-07. 
 153. This is precisely why, rather than the default regime itself, it is the actual 
availability of structural defenses that acts as a strong disincentive to creeping 
acquisitions, that is, acquisitions made through open purchases in the market or other 
street sweeps techniques, which allow a person to gain de facto control without actually 
ever launching a tender offer. If structural defenses were available in jurisdictions 
adopting the board neutrality rule, a prospective acquirer of de facto control would 
likely be barred from accumulating a very significant foothold without actually 
triggering the structural defensive mechanism. For example, poison pills have 
triggering thresholds ranging from 5% to 20% of a corporation’s voting stock. See 
supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 154. If the spectrum is very limited, then a pro-target default would perform better. 
Nevertheless, this has nothing to do with the default regime itself, especially if the 
regime is silent on the point. I tend to agree with Professor Luca Enriques, of the 
University of Oxford faculty of law, as he pointed out to me when commenting on an 
early draft of this article, that one should not necessarily ascribe the unavailability of 
structural defenses to corporate law. According to Enriques, the unavailability may be 
considered a product of what he labels as “negative takeover law,” that is, the lack of a 
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not really about who calls the shots, but what type of shots a company 
can use. 
3. Summary and Preliminary Remarks 
In Part III.A, I have observed that in the abstract the Delaware 
regime coupling poison pills and proxy fights and the British board 
neutrality rule can lead to the same results and therefore can be 
considered as simple default regimes that shareholders can reverse 
(specifically, if shareholders want the acquisition to succeed in 
Delaware and fail in the United Kingdom). If shareholders can 
ultimately decide, those takeover regimes can be considered neutral if 
not immaterial. 
However, as Part III.B has shown, there exist corporate law 
collateral factors that can tip the scales in favor of the default regime, 
including: the election and voting fronts, staggered boards, limitations to 
director removability, shareholders’ inability to call special meetings or 
to act by written consent, supermajority provisions, unbalanced proxy 
rules, and ineffective rules policing shareholders’ conflict of interest. 
The question then becomes: How relevant are these corporate law 
collateral factors? 
There are two possibilities here: either (1) their impact is minimal 
or not material, and one could conclude that the over thirty year debate 
on the optimal allocation of power between shareholders and directors is 
dealing with a secondary issue or, (2) if their impact actually turns out to 
be of some relevance, the debate has then been focusing too much on the 
takeover regime and, with some exceptions, too little on these corporate 
law collateral factors that act as barriers to the reversibility of the 
default. 
                                                                                                                 
takeover rule (either implicit or explicit) that can guarantee an effective veto on 
takeovers. The lack of such a rule is in my view what actually makes corporate law 
relevant on this front. This is why I argue that takeover law and policy should address 
such issues. 
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C. PRACTICAL RELEVANCE OF THE CORPORATE LAW COLLATERAL 
FACTORS THAT ALTER THE DELAWARE REGIME 
Part III.C analyzes a sample of 2417 Delaware public corporations 
from a FactSet SharkRepellent database,155 which represents the 
universe of Delaware public corporations as of August 28, 2013. 
Out of that total, there are 679 corporations where none of the 
following corporate law collateral factors are at work: staggered board, 
supermajority to remove directors, inability for shareholders to call 
special meetings or to act by written consent, and no director 
removability in absence of cause. These 679 corporations amount to 
28.1% of the total number of Delaware public corporations and 59.3% 
in terms of market capitalization. Leaving aside other factors such as 
ownership structure, and assuming a neutral impact of proxy rules and 
conflict of interest rules and that no significant corporate law collateral 
factors are also at work, these corporations, totaling over half the market 
capitalization of Delaware companies, differ very little from their United 
Kingdom peers in terms of how takeover proof they are from a purely 
legal standpoint. The fact that these corporations can adopt and/or keep 
a pill in place should not matter if a hostile tender offer is launched and 
shareholders are requested to cast their vote to approve or reject the 
acquisition.156 
                                                                                                                 
 155. August 2013 FactSet SharkRepellent Delaware Database (on file with author). 
 156. The following table selects some data included in the Takeover Defense Trend 
Analysis Snapshots for 2008 and 2013 provided by FactSet SharkRepellent (on file 
with author), which, unlike the August 2013 FactSet SharkRepellent Delaware 
Database that only includes data from corporations incorporated in Delaware, 
aggregates data for all U.S. corporations. In looking at the Takeover Defense Trend 
Snapshots for 2008 and 2013, one can observe a slight decrease in the number of 
companies using corporate law collateral factors to make themselves takeover proof. 
  2008 2013 
Number of Corporations 3869 3768 
Staggered Board 50.50% 43.52% 
Shareholders cannot call special meetings 53.09% 50.53% 
Shareholders cannot act by written consent 69.73% 69.13% 
Directors removed only for cause 47.97% 46.36% 
Supermajority required for director removal 31.84% 31.40% 
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Turning to Delaware corporations, where corporate law collateral 
factors are at work, the August 2013 FactSet SharkRepellent Delaware 
Database reveals the following: 
(i) staggered boards—there are 1106 corporations with a staggered 
board in place, which account for 45.8% of the total corporations and 
15.5% in terms of market capitalization; 
(ii) special meetings/action by written consent—there are 1220 
corporations in which shareholders can neither call special meetings nor 
act by written consent, which account for 50.5% of the total 
corporations and 31.5% in terms of market capitalization; 
(iii) supermajority to remove directors—there are 655 corporations 
in which shareholders need more than a simple majority to remove 
directors, which account for 27.1% of the total and 14.7% in terms of 
market capitalization, which, to avoid overlaps, is appropriate to isolate 
as follows: 
(a) if we exclude corporations with staggered boards, we are left 
with 200 corporations, which account for 8.3% of the total and 8.8% in 
terms of market capitalization, 
(b) if we exclude corporations in which shareholders can neither 
call special meetings nor act by written consent, we are left with 154 
corporations, which account for 6.4% of the total and 2.2% in terms of 
market capitalization, and 
(c) if we exclude corporations with staggered boards and in which 
shareholders can neither call special meetings nor act by written 
consent, we are left with sixty-nine corporations, which account for 
2.9% of the total and 1.2% in terms of market capitalization; and 
(iv) director removability only for cause—there are 1149 
corporations in which directors cannot be removed without cause, which 
account for 47.5% of the total and 23.7% in terms of market 
capitalization, which, to avoid overlaps, is appropriate to isolate as 
follows: 
(a) if we exclude corporations with staggered boards, we are left 
with 231 corporations, which account for 9.6% of the total and 10.1% in 
terms of market capitalization, 
(b) if we exclude corporations in which shareholders can neither 
call special meetings nor act by written consent, we are left with 323 
corporations, which account for 13.4% of the total and 7.6% in terms of 
market capitalization, and 
(c) if we exclude corporations with staggered boards and in which 
shareholders can neither call special meetings nor act by written 
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consent, we are left with 101 corporations, which account for 4.2% of 
the total and 4.4% in terms of market capitalization. 
Table I breaks down all of the data collected. 
 
Table I Corporate Law Collateral Factors at Work with Delaware 
Public Corporations (August 2013 FactSet Delaware Database) 
 
Corporate Law 
Collateral Factor Number Percent 
Amount 
Market Cap 
(Millions) 
Percent 
Market 
Cap 
Staggered board 1106 45.8% $1,794,237 15.5% 
Shareholders can neither 
call special meeting nor 
act by written consent 
1220 
 
50.5% 
 
$3,649,770 
 
31.5% 
 
Supermajority required to 
remove directors: 655 27.1% $1,707,478 14.7% 
a. Without a staggered 
board 200 8.3% $1,015,577 8.8% 
b. Without limitations 
on shareholders’ 
ability to call special 
meetings/act by 
written consent 
154 6.4% $255,918 2.2% 
c. Without either 
staggered board and 
limitations on 
shareholders’ ability 
to call special 
meetings/act by 
consent 
 
69 
 
2.9% 
 
$133,746 
 
1.2% 
Directors can only be 
removed for cause: 1149 47.5% $2,742,295 23.7% 
a. Without a staggered 
board 231 9.6% $1,174,426 10.1% 
b. Without limitations 
on shareholders’ 
ability to call special 
meetings/act by 
consent 
323 13.4% $882,263 7.6% 
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Corporate Law 
Collateral Factor Number Percent 
Amount 
Market Cap 
(Millions) 
Percent 
Market 
Cap 
c. Without either 
staggered board and 
limitations on 
shareholders’ 
ability to call 
special meetings/act 
by consent 
101 4.2% $510,156 4.4% 
Corporations without any 
of the foregoing corporate 
law collateral factors 
 
679 
 
 
28.1% 
 
 
$6,862,069 
 
 
59.3% 
 
Corporations without 
staggered board, 
supermajority to remove 
directors and director 
removability only for 
cause 
935 
 
38.7% 
 
$7,929,400 
 
68.5% 
 
Total Corporations 2417 100% $11,580,189 100% 
 
In looking at the data, one might notice that the relatively high 
percentage of Delaware corporations with a staggered board (45.8%) is 
mainly composed of small-to-mid caps, since in terms of market 
capitalization the percentage is relatively small (15.5%): it is no surprise 
that small-to-mid caps are easier targets to conquer in a hostile deal 
(easier both in terms of the amount of investment required and in terms 
of the PR complexity of winning larger corporations). 
Corporations in which a supermajority is required to remove 
directors and win a proxy fight are a little over one quarter of all the 
corporations (27.1%) and a smaller portion from a market capitalization 
standpoint (14.7%). There are 200 corporations that do not have a 
staggered board but do require a supermajority to remove directors, 
which is 8.3% of all corporations and 8.8% in terms of market 
capitalization. This finding is relevant, as supermajorities have been 
neglected by the scholarship that focused on staggered boards, yet these 
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companies have enhanced defenses that make the reverse of the pro-
target default quite problematic as shown earlier on in this article.157 
With regard to stockholders’ ability to call special meetings or act 
by written consent, for 50.5% of corporations (31.5% in terms of market 
capitalization), hostile bidders are de facto compelled to wait for the 
next annual meeting to have a vote on the acquisition. As noted earlier 
in Part III.B.1.a, the impact of this corporate law collateral factor is 
generally not very significant, as it can be dealt with through adequate 
pre-planning. If we ignore this factor and consider only corporations 
without a staggered board, with no supermajority required to remove 
directors and in which directors can be removed without cause (that is, 
corporations where all strong corporate law collateral factors are 
absent), we have a total of 935 corporations, which represent 38.7% of 
the sample (68.5% in terms of market capitalization). This means that 
corporations totaling 68.5% of the aggregate market capitalization of 
Delaware public corporations do not have significant corporate law 
collateral factors at work that make a reversal of the pro-target default 
regime particularly hard.158 
In other words, in terms of market capitalization, approximately 
70% of the value of Delaware companies is not subject to stringent 
defenses against hostile takeovers irrespective of whether they have 
adopted a poison pill. 
IV. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE TWO “DEFAULT” REGIMES 
Part III showed that, assuming the absence of what we called 
corporate law collateral factors, the difference between the Delaware 
and U.K. anti-takeover regimes is negligible. Part III.C showed that 
28.1% in terms of number and 59.3% in terms of capitalization in a 
sample of 2417 Delaware public corporations are not affected by 
corporate law collateral factors (the percentages rise to 38.7% and 
68.5%, respectively, if we do not consider shareholders’ inability to call 
special meetings or to act by written consent, which are admittedly the 
least pervasive of those factors). It is no surprise that in Delaware the 
                                                                                                                 
 157. See supra Part III.B.1.d. 
 158. Except that in some of these corporations, hostile bidders would need to plan 
their bids around the corporation’s annual meeting in order to be able to replace the 
directors and redeem the pill. 
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real heat of the legal battle shifted from strict takeover law to one of the 
main corporate law collateral factors we described—staggered boards.159 
Assuming the presence of one or more of those corporate law 
collateral factors, and therefore assuming the takeover regime does 
ultimately matter, Part IV seeks to determine which regime is preferable 
in the abstract to preserve shareholders’ power to determine the outcome 
of an acquisition, which in turn depends on what corporate law collateral 
factors are at work and how they interact with the regime.160 
To be sure, some problems are common to both regimes. 
First, supermajority provisions alter the reversibility of the default. 
In a pro-target regime, this means more entrenchment, since a simple 
majority of the share capital would not have the ability to remove the 
board to eliminate the defenses in place. In a pro-shareholder regime, a 
supermajority provision implies less likelihood that defenses would ever 
be approved, which might possibly result in an excess of value-
decreasing acquisitions that cannot be screened out by a shareholder 
vote. 
Second, proxy rules can play a crucial role and, as noted earlier in 
Part III.B.1.c, if they are significantly biased for either side, the anti-
takeover regime will ultimately not matter. In other words, if all else is 
equal (that is, with no supermajority requirements, staggered board or 
other corporate law collateral factors at work), if proxy rules are so 
significantly biased in favor of incumbents or insurgents that they might 
well be more relevant than the actual anti-takeover default regime in 
determining the ultimate outcome of the acquisition. 
                                                                                                                 
 159. See supra note 54. 
 160. This Article briefly discusses (infra Part IV.C) whether it is preferable for the 
takeover regime to be mandatory in nature, meaning set by the legislature yet subject to 
the possibility for shareholders to reverse it during an actual bid, or optional in nature, 
allowing corporations to choose whatever regime they want, subject to certain 
procedures regarding midstream changes. See infra Part IV.C; see also Enriques, Gilson 
& Pacces, supra note 92, at 12-14.  As I will point out infra Part IV.C, I tend to agree 
from a policy standpoint that “individual companies should be able to decide ‘who 
decides[]’” (whether a hostile takeover goes forward).  However, it is essential to 
remember that if what companies are determining is just the “who decides” question, 
while neglecting the corporate law collateral factors, the benefits of letting companies 
decide would be limited. See infra Part IV.C; see also Enriques, Gilson & Pacces, supra 
note 92, at 4-5. 
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Third, ineffective rules policing conflict of interest might increase 
the chances of success of either the directors or the bidder depending on 
whether those rules are incumbent- or insurgent-friendly, respectively. 
A. THE PRO-TARGET DEFAULT REGIME IN LIGHT OF THE CORPORATE 
LAW COLLATERAL FACTORS 
When a jurisdiction’s corporate law is flexible enough to permit 
structural defenses, a pro-target default regime allows shareholders to 
decide whether or not the bid should succeed without the need to take 
any operational action that might not be an effective response and/or 
might waste value.161 Additionally, even if the Delaware approach does 
not insulate directors from market forces, it gives them the 
psychological comfort that they will be well positioned to negotiate with 
the bidder, which should ultimately help both them and the shareholders 
get a better deal.162 This, in turn, should allow directors to focus on the 
                                                                                                                 
 161. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 162. Some notable scholars oppose the view that a pro-target regime and takeover 
defenses help directors be better negotiators on shareholders’ behalf. See Subramanian, 
supra note 60. My claim is that a pro-target regime, absent corporate law collateral 
factors contributing to director entrenchment, would effectively give directors the 
advantage of timing and a better mastering of the proxy machinery. I agree these are not 
enormous advantages, yet they still provide something directors can count on when 
responding to an unsolicited bidder, especially if compared with the opposite scenario 
of board passivity where voting inertia favors bidders.  Note that the two default 
regimes are not materially different, but for the corporate law collateral factors. One 
could object in theory that timing may actually give directors a big advantage in the 
pro-target regime, as in some circumstances they could dispose of crown jewels of the 
company quickly in order to dissuade a bidder from pursuing the planned acquisition. 
See supra note 125, for an example of this discussed in the context of the Exact 
Sciences deal. However, with respect to Delaware, this objection would be valid only 
for circumstances in which the disposition of crown jewels would neither trigger Revlon 
(and therefore kick the target out of Unocal and Unitrin, which is what this article 
focuses on) nor a stockholder vote under Section 271 of the DGCL, which in turn 
would neutralize the director primacy warranted by Unocal and Unitrin. See DEL. CODE 
ANN. TIT. 8, § 271 (2014); Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995); 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); 
Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); see also supra notes 94-96 and 
accompanying text. In other words, the size of the crown jewel must not be too 
significant. In the case of a divestiture of a core asset of a size not sufficient to trigger 
any such regime or provision, but sufficient to dissuade a bidder from continuing with 
the acquisition plan, we would be dealing with a faux corporate control transaction. 
What the bidder would really be pursuing in this scenario is a specific asset of the 
target—directors are generally subject to the business judgment rule as to when and to 
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business rather than spend too much time worrying about takeovers and 
pre-planning defenses.163 
The pro-target default regime leaves shareholders powerless in a 
series of circumstances. 
When a company has an effective staggered board, the likelihood 
of a reversal of the default by shareholders is very remote—coupled 
with a staggered board, the pro-target regime ends up promoting 
managerial entrenchment.164 
When shareholders cannot call special meetings or act by written 
consent, a target is potentially subject to the risk of a hostile takeover 
only in certain periods within a year—the risk of entrenchment in this 
case is arguably less relevant, although it can pose certain risks in 
control contests that fall outside the Revlon zone.165 
Leaving aside staggered boards, which as noted earlier166 are 
present in 45.8% of Delaware public corporations (15.5% in terms of 
market capitalization), data on takeover activity for Delaware companies 
seem to indicate that a pro-target regime has somewhat worked thus far, 
in that it has not insulated directors entirely, it has provided a tool to 
negotiate for higher takeover premiums and still leaves shareholders the 
opportunity to weigh and act upon the merits of the bid.167 In light of 
                                                                                                                 
whom to sell core assets. See generally Hollinger, Inc. v. Hollinger Int’l, Inc., 858 A.2d 
342 (Del. Ch. 2004) (illustrating the ability of a board to sell a core asset without the 
need for shareholder approval under Section 271 of the DGCL). But see Katz v. 
Bregman, 431 A.2d 1274 (Del. Ch. 1981). 
 163. See Coates, supra note 26, at 1190 (“[I]f US takeover experience has any 
lessons, it is that top managers worry about few things more than preserving the control 
of their firms”); see also infra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 164. As anticipated, a proposed solution for this problem is that if a bidder wins the 
first election, it should be considered a referendum on the offer, and the board should be 
forced by the judge to redeem the pill. See Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 
52, at 944-45. While casting several doubts on the policy merits of staggered boards, 
the Delaware Court of Chancery did not follow such a proposal in Airgas. Air Prods. & 
Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 89 (Del. Ch. 2011). Incidentally, as previously 
mentioned in the context of the attempted acquisition of Airgas, the newly-elected 
directors, who were all nominated by the bidder, voted unanimously with the rest of the 
target board to keep the poison pill in place. See also supra note 54. 
 165. See supra Part III.B.1.a. 
 166. See supra Part III.C. 
 167. See John C. Coates IV, Empirical Evidence on Structural Takeover Defense: 
Where Do We Stand?, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 783, 797 (2000) (analyzing empirical 
studies published between 1986 and 2000 and finding that “Delaware courts should 
take some comfort from the fact that they resisted strong academic arguments and 
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this, the debate on shareholder adopted bylaws to let shareholders have a 
say on pills prior to a bid being actually on the table,168 is less relevant, 
at least for companies without a staggered board, than its proponents 
would acknowledge. 
Another unintentional consequence of a pro-target regime is that if 
corporate law rules are not flexible enough to permit structural 
defenses,169 directors would be empowered to react, but would only have 
the option to adopt transactional defenses, which might not be an 
effective response against low ball offers and/or might be detrimental to 
the company and its shareholders. This problem is of course exacerbated 
if a jurisdiction lacks adequate fiduciary duties or an effective 
enforcement system to police directors and management, since in such a 
case they would have a blank check to engage in wasteful transactions 
that are aimed only at preserving their power. 
B. THE PRO-SHAREHOLDER REGIME IN LIGHT OF THE CORPORATE LAW 
COLLATERAL FACTORS 
The pro-shareholder regime would do a better job at tackling 
managerial agency costs, since, no matter how easy it is to get 
shareholders to approve defenses, managers would psychologically 
perceive the threat of a takeover as more imminent and will work harder 
to keep stock prices high and make a takeover more difficult.170 Indeed, 
under the regime, companies have to go to the trouble of getting 
shareholders to approve defenses, with all the consequences that this 
effort may generate (i.e., a potential drop in the stock price). Particularly 
for jurisdictions where proxy access is suboptimal and/or corporate law 
is otherwise incapable of policing directors and managers—in 
jurisdictions where a pro-target approach would create a formidable 
shield for directors—a pro-shareholder regime would be superior, for 
purposes of curbing agency costs. However this would come at a price: 
                                                                                                                 
political efforts that attempted to push them to dramatically repudiate pills and other 
structural defenses. The empirical case against defenses . . . is not as compelling as it 
might have seemed to hostile commentators.”); see also Barry & Hatfield, supra note 
26, at 637, 654 (presenting a model predicting that poison pills increase target 
shareholder returns). 
 168. See supra Part I.C. 
 169. Indeed, this clearly is not the case for Delaware—and several other state 
jurisdictions in the United States, for that matter. 
 170. This is the main point made by the theorists of board passivity. See Easterbrook 
& Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 29, at 1174; see generally supra note 27. 
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when corporate law rules are not flexible enough to permit structural 
defenses, bidders have a clear advantage, since shareholders would 
sometimes be stuck between two suboptimal choices—whether to accept 
the bid or approve a value wasting transactional defense. This might 
result in an excess of acquisition transactions with a low premium, 
which is an undesirable policy outcome. 
Another consequence of the pro-shareholder approach is that, if 
directors and management perceive they are at risk, given they do not 
have adequate post-bid responses, they might spend too much time and 
resources to put pre-takeover defenses in place. By trying to limit their 
discretion pending a bid, the pro-shareholder approach ends up inducing 
directors, who have a natural antipathy to any unsolicited acquisition 
proposal,171 to make the company takeover-proof via other means. For 
instance, some authors have stressed that directors could abusively agree 
to change-of-control provisions in the company’s core agreements (joint 
ventures, credit agreements, bond indentures, employment agreements, 
intellectual property licenses, etc.) to dissuade, or create an additional 
and significant financial burden on, a potential acquirer.172 
                                                                                                                 
 171. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1345, 1350 (Del. 1985) 
(describing methods utilized by target companies to forestall undesirable takeover 
activity); see also Coates, supra note 26, at 1190 (“[I]f US takeover experience has any 
lessons, it is that top managers worry about few things more than loss of control.”). 
 172. See Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of 
Shareholder Choice, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 577, 614 (2003).  The problematic aspect of 
pre-bid defenses is that it is complicated to detect a defensive element in the context of 
transactions management enters into during peaceful times. Even more complicated is 
to prove that such defensive element represents the ultimate purpose of the given 
transaction. As a result, given the unlikelihood a pre-bid defense will end up being 
judicially second guessed at some later stage (that is, when a bid is on the table), such 
defenses are riskier in that they can be potentially adopted in an unleashed manner by 
management, especially if management cannot count on effective defensive tools once 
a bid is launched. For recent transactions entered into in the context of a larger M&A 
deal that had the potential of deterring unsolicited bids—however, notably in the 
context of the legitimacy of a hidden lock-up under Revlon—see the $3.1 billion 
convertible bond issued by SprintNextel to Softbank in October 2012 (if converted, 
Softbank would have obtained an approximately 20% stake in the target) and the 
NYSE/ICE deal for Liffe, NYSE’s European derivatives unit, to clear its trades through 
ICE for at least two years (both transactions would stand irrespective of whether the 
larger underlying M&A deals closed). See also Jodi Xu & Jeffrey McCracken, Dish 
May Face Additional $1.2 Billion Sprint Cost, BLOOMBERG (June 14, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-14/dish-may-face-additional-1-2-billion-
sprint-cost.html; David Benoit, Security Detail Protects NYSE Deal, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 
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Pre-bid defenses are not the sole concern associated with the 
collateral effects of a pro-shareholder default regime. Such a regime 
might affect ownership structures, possibly leading to more 
concentration of stock ownership.173 First, incumbents (shareholders 
having working control of a company or managers themselves) may be 
tempted to secure a more stable controlling position by building blocks 
so as to limit or avoid unsolicited bids altogether.174 Second, the fear of 
leaving control up for grabs might convince companies to create dual-
class voting structures,175 sell smaller stakes at the IPO stage, or to stay 
away from capital markets to begin with. 
C. SUMMARY AND POLICY REMARKS 
The assessment of the two different regimes in relation to various 
corporate law collateral factors shows that there is no regime on its face 
that is clearly preferable over the other in awarding shareholders the 
power (or some power) to determine the outcome of an acquisition. 
Nonetheless, the analysis demands some policy considerations. 
On one hand, factors limiting the reversibility of a regime should be 
eliminated. This statement is less justified by the fact that reversibility is 
per se good policy than by acknowledging that once a shareholder vote 
is contemplated as the principle (or, as in Delaware, the last) safeguard, 
it is not good policy to let collateral aspects jeopardize the process. 
Therefore, the elimination of obstacles to the free and clear exercise of 
shareholder vote should be the goal of policymakers whose intention is 
to give shareholders a critical say on an acquisition outcome. First, a 
                                                                                                                 
30, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873239261045782741123 
50462452.html. 
 173. Enriques & Gatti, supra note 86, at 29. See, e.g., Cools, supra note 116, at 756-
57 (exemplifying a similar approach, albeit in connection with the allocation of 
corporate powers more generally (and not just in the takeover context)). 
 174. Enriques & Gatti, supra note 86, at 29 n.141 (noting that ”[b]uilding blocks can 
either facilitate the approval of defensive tactics by the shareholders’ meeting or, more 
simply, make the control of the company not contestable to begin with”). 
 175. Jeff Green & Ari Levy, Zuckerberg Grip Becomes New Normal in Silicon 
Valley, BLOOMBERG (May 7, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-
07/zuckerberg-stock-grip-becomes-new-normal-in-silicon-valley-tech.html; see also 
WILMERHALE, 2013 M&A REPORT 14-15 (2013), available at www.wilmerhale.com/ 
uploadedFiles/WilmerHale_Shared_Content/Files/Editorial/Publication/2013-
wilmerhale-ma-report.pdf (showing the continued trend of new firms going public with 
several defensive measures, such as staggered boards, multi-class capital structures, and 
limitations to call special meetings). 
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simple majority principle should apply to any shareholder vote to decide 
whether the bid should succeed; otherwise, supermajority provisions 
give minorities an unwarranted veto power. Second, staggered boards 
should not alter the outcome of a vote on the bid. As some legal 
commentators have argued, in the context of a takeover attempt 
combined with a proxy contest to renew a slot of directors, a shareholder 
vote to replace incumbents should be considered a referendum in favor 
of the bid; the remaining directors should not continue to veto the bid. 
Instead, they should redeem the pill.176 Third, proxy access and conflict 
of interest rules should give no clear advantage to any side and should 
be carefully reconsidered when they apply to the takeover situation. 
On the other hand, the types of defenses that may be adopted by 
companies can impact policy choices. If structural defenses are 
available, both regimes achieve valuable policy goals (assuming they 
can be easily reversed).177 Conversely, if structural defenses are not 
available, both regimes have significant drawbacks, such as not 
providing an effective response against low-ball bids, leading to value 
wasting transactional defenses and, in a pro-shareholder regime, creating 
incentives to adopt pre-bid defenses.178 Therefore, the problem of the 
optimal allocation of corporate powers when deciding on the fate of an 
unsolicited bid and the problem of the defenses a corporation can adopt 
should each be considered by a comprehensive policy reform.179 
                                                                                                                 
 176. Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 52, at 944-45. 
 177. The pro-target approach facilitates management’s bargaining for higher 
takeover premiums, while the pro-shareholder approach curbs agency costs. Note that 
the easier it is to reverse a regime with a shareholder vote, the less important the default 
is and the less effective it is in the attainment of the policy goals the default is meant to 
pursue. 
 178. See Arlen & Talley, supra note 172, at 603-13.   
 179. It is very important for shareholders to be able to rely on devices that allow 
them to vote against an acquisition attempt without having the company entertain 
disruptive defensive actions. Once shareholders are empowered to approve defensive 
actions, one should assume that a jurisdiction attaches some positive function to 
defenses, and thus, there should be no reason for permitting only a limited set of 
defenses and excluding those that are in the best interests of shareholders. In other 
words, all else being equal, once a jurisdiction allows takeover defenses, as in the 
Delaware and United Kingdom systems, giving more options to companies should help 
them to allow shareholders make the most effective choice on the bid. The possible 
objection that more discretion might result in more mistakes reflects a paternalistic 
view of the corporate world, which should not be taken into consideration especially if 
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I do not intend to endorse the proposition that giving shareholders a 
critical say in an acquisition (no matter whether the default initially 
favors them or the directors) is better policy than an alternative system 
in which shareholders have no say whatsoever (not including 
Delaware,180 at least absent staggered boards and other entrenching 
corporate law collateral factors, but arguably some other state 
jurisdictions, such as Georgia, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia181). 
That conclusion is not central to my thesis here, which is to raise 
awareness of the impact of corporate law collateral factors. 
Some scholars have recently argued that policymakers should leave 
it to companies to decide the “who decides” question as to whether a 
takeover should go through or not.182 In the past, in the context of 
analyzing the Takeover Bids Directive, I have shown sympathy for a 
                                                                                                                 
one assumes directors have fiduciary duties and other ex-post sanctions (and a good 
enforcement system) in place. 
 180. Interestingly, although Delaware allows board insulation and entrenchment via 
corporate law collateral factors such as staggered boards, it does not allow corporations 
to opt out of Unocal and Unitrin altogether (not even, it would appear, on a temporary 
basis with sunset arrangements) as that would violate the Quickturn doctrine. Quickturn 
Design Sys. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1293 (Del. 1998); Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. 
Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 
(Del. 1985); see supra note 78 and accompanying text. The DGCL does not grant 
corporations the contractual freedom to select entrenchment openly, yet it does not 
interfere with directors’ de facto ability to insulate themselves through other means (the 
corporate law collateral factors). 
 181. See Subramanian, supra note 60, at 628 (noting how these states have validated 
either dead hand or slow hand pills, which “are far more potent than the plain vanilla 
pills that are valid in Delaware; the dead hand pill in particular [which is valid in 
Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Virginia,] is generally understood to be a complete defense 
against a hostile takeover bid”). 
 182. Enriques, Gilson & Pacces, supra note 92, at 12-14.  In support of this view is 
the line of thought that the diverse defense levels that corporations show can be 
explained because: (i) corporations with the highest expected synergies should be the 
most likely to have effective staggered boards—that would include highly technology-
intensive companies and companies with nontraditional businesses; (ii) defenses appear 
more frequently among firms in industries where takeovers are more common and in 
which managerial performance is easier to observe; and (iii) staggered boards increase 
value when firms have higher advisory needs (that is, large and complex firms) and low 
monitoring costs. See Barry & Hatfield, supra note 26, at 654, 693-95 (citing various 
empirical studies, including Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters 
Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 96 
tbl.2 (2001)). 
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somewhat similar approach.183 However, the importance for 
policymakers to acknowledge and address the corporate law collateral 
factors cannot be stressed enough. If all companies are deciding on is in 
fact the “who decides” question, while neglecting such other factors 
(some of which they admittedly control, such as factors that can be 
determined at the charter or bylaws level, some others they do not, such 
as certain mandatory rules that are generally set by the legislators—e.g., 
the regime on shareholders’ conflict of interest or the proxy rules), the 
benefits of letting companies determine what takeover rules they should 
be subject to would be partial at best, if not minimal. In other words, 
there can be no effective takeover reform without expressly addressing 
all the potential issues raised by the corporate law collateral factors.184 
Needless to say, interpreters of applicable positive law should also 
address the impact of corporate law collateral factors and possibly 
distinguish cases and tweak existing standards based on that. 
A final note: in Delaware companies are already free to decide the 
level of corporate law collateral factors they intend to be subject to, yet 
in practice this means that choices can for the most part be expressed 
only at the IPO-stage by founders/managers: as soon as the company 
goes public the rules governing charter amendments are such that they 
create a perennial impasse given the reciprocal veto power of directors 
and shareholders (each category having to approve the amendment 
                                                                                                                 
 183. See Gatti, supra note 6, at 568-69 (arguing an optional system is better than a 
mandatory system in the EU); id. at 570-71 (arguing that “a pro-takeover default is 
preferable, as it requires targets to take steps to reverse it, which is something that may 
have a negative impact on stock prices and will shine a spotlight on targets that try to 
hide, whereas, in the case of the adoption of a pro-[target] default, the market will quite 
certainly not expect that many ‘virtuous’ targets will take actions to reverse it”).  I note 
incidentally that even though the optional pro-takeover default I advocated was not 
expressly contemplated by the Takeover Bids Directive,  I nonetheless concluded that 
Member States could actually adopt it on their own, as in my view such solution would 
not materially depart from the Directive. Id. at 571. Note that, starting in 2009, Italy has 
in fact adopted such a solution: the board neutrality rule is a default rule companies can 
opt out of if they so choose. See, e.g., Enriques, Gilson & Pacces, supra note 92, at 40 
n.131 (noting that FIAT, a leading Italian automaker, opted out of the board neutrality 
rule). 
 184. See Luca Enriques, European Takeover Law: The Case for a Neutral 
Approach, 22 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 623, 638-39 (2011) (discussing the topic from an EU 
reform standpoint and conceding that “we cannot expect the EU to revise all company 
and securities law rules having an even more indirect effect on takeovers”). 
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pursuant to Section 242(b)(1)-(2) of the DGCL).185 The results are quite 
absurd: each Delaware company is subject to a static regime it chose 
once and for all at the IPO-stage, with very little chance to further adapt 
to changes (market changes, preference changes, etc.). Policy proposals 
seeking to affect the power to decide on takeovers must not only 
consider the corporate law collateral factors I identify, but must also 
consider the process by which these factors are selected. The proper 
perspective is a dynamic one: one that takes into account not only rules 
governing the initial selection of the takeover regime cum collateral 
factors, but also (new) rules governing the power to alter this initial 
selection. Mandatory re-openings and sunsets are the first solutions that 
come to mind, yet the optimal way to address Section 242-type 
reciprocal vetoes is something that begs for in-depth study. 
CONCLUSION 
Without “corporate law collateral factors,” such as shareholders’ 
ability to call special meetings or act by written consent, the presence of 
supermajority provisions, biased proxy rules, ineffective rules policing 
shareholders’ conflict of interest, staggered boards and director 
removability, the two seemingly opposite anti-takeover regimes in 
Delaware and in the United Kingdom would lead to the same acquisition 
outcomes. Therefore, most of the debate on the best takeover policy 
would miss the point that the regimes in themselves are rather 
immaterial but for those factors, which make the real difference between 
the two approaches. 
Ultimately, there has been too much emphasis on the allocation of 
the power to decide on acquisitions and too little on other external rules, 
the corporate law collateral factors, which have bigger effects on the 
intended policy purpose that under each regime purports to give 
shareholders the decisive (or at least some critical) power to determine 
the outcome of the acquisition. With the notable exception of staggered 
boards, not enough attention has been given to the barriers to 
reversibility of the takeover default regime that such collateral factors 
raise. 
If a jurisdiction is serious about fostering shareholder powers in the 
context of an acquisition, rather than just determining which way to set 
the default, policymakers should focus on eliminating, or containing the 
                                                                                                                 
 185. See DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 242(b)(1)–(2) (2014) (requiring all changes to 
certificate of incorporation be approved by both the board and the shareholders). 
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reach of, such barriers. Also, if a jurisdiction is serious about takeover 
regulation in general, policymakers should consider addressing all 
corporate law collateral factors within the body of takeover law 
(whether or not statutory). Given the importance of takeovers, it is odd 
not to discuss tailored rules (applicable in the takeover context only and 
explicitly preempting basic corporate law principles) for such subjects 
as shareholders’ conflicts of interest, proxy rules, availability of poison 
pills, and so forth. Leaving the corporate law collateral factors to general 
corporate law does a disservice to takeover players and stakeholders. 
 
